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Abstract
Indigenous peoples’ struggles of the right to self-determination are often framed as claims
against a unified state. However, explanation of the forces inhibiting the expression of
Indigenous self-determination should not settle with an understanding of the imposing power of
the state. As I show, the realization of self-determination is undermined by the cumulative effects
of legal practices and knowledges that contribute to the division of collective autonomies and
disruption of their governance practices. In this transnational and comparative work on the
emerging ‘right to consent’ to resource extraction in South Africa and Canada, I argue that we
might understand these dynamics by examining self-determination as a response to legal
violence. I explain that legal violence in contemporary post-colonial conditions is expressed
spatially through the categories of property and jurisdiction. One of the effects of conditions of
legal violence is not only dispossession, but that Indigenous peoples’ assertions of selfdetermination and autonomy face settler counter-claims decrying ‘internal conflict’ as evidence
of subaltern political instability and inferiority. The analysis covers local contexts, national
jurisprudence, and transnational norms related to the right to consent in both countries.
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Chapter 1: Self-determination as resistance to legal violence
Introduction
We are witnessing an Indigenous resurgence in Canada and South Africa. Two cases, happening
nearly in parallel, are illustrative of the power struggles between the state and Indigenous
peoples’ rights to land and territory in both countries. In Canada, the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary
Chieftaincy has inspired people across the country to join mass protests and blockades of
railways in support of their efforts to uphold Indigenous laws in the context of a natural gas
pipeline being built across their unceded territory. In South Africa, the Amadiba Crisis
Committee (ACC) has celebrated a court victory declaring their ‘right to say no’ to resource
extraction on their land in Xolobeni, a statement that has inspired protests and social movements
across the country and region.1 In both countries those on the front lines have unmasked
colonial-era power and left states scrambling to maintain the legitimacy of laws that are directly
linked to, or reflect, colonial strategies of land dispossession and control of natural resources.
In both cases we are witness to national reconciliation narratives punctuated by localized
violence. The Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Leadership and its supporters, as well as leaders from the
Xolobeni community, condemn the efforts of state and corporate actors by referring to their
violent effects. Their assertions of self-determination and collective autonomy are narrated
through a language of conflict. 0They refer, as I show throughout the thesis, to both the violence

1

See Amandla Media, ‘We Communities Have Been Saying No!’
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SemHA4uhM90 (2020); WOMIN Collective (2020) Beyond Extractivism:
Reclaiming Peoples Power, Our Right To Say No! At: https://womin.org.za/our-work/main-supportactivities/beyond-extractivism-reclaiming-peoples-power,-our-right-to-say-no.html; Thematic Social Forum (2020)
‘Resisting mining and extractivism: The Right to Say No Campaign’. At:
https://www.thematicsocialforum.org/resisting;

1

of imposed resource development, as well as to the conflicts that have emerged within and
between their communities as a result of the resource development projects.
In fascinating parallel, in Unist’ot’en and Xolobeni, disagreements and power struggles
are represented as revealing a conflict between hereditary leadership, elected and state
recognized indigenous leadership, state actors, and corporations. The simple narrative goes
something like this – the majority and elected Indigenous leadership agree to the proposed
resource extraction, there is a small group of peoples following the lead of unelected hereditary
leadership, supported by protestors, who are illegally stopping the projects. The state is simply,
and neutrally, upholding the law and protecting the rights of the corporations to continue their
work. This simple narrative of actors and their conflicts is repeated in popular media and
commentary in both countries. It fits the narrative of the ‘criminalization of protest’, one that is
widely used in human rights reporting internationally. Indeed, the criminalization of land
defenders, and Indigenous land defenders more specifically, is on the rise internationally.2
Criminalization often involves the targeting of specific individuals, however it has much wider
impacts on collectivities.3 It does powerful material work in conditions of settler-colonialism. As
I show, there is an important and widely unacknowledged relationship between law and the
production of knowledge about the conflicts in both countries. More specifically, law works
through jurisdiction and property to both narrate conflict and legitimate violence.
The parallel temporal unfolding of events in Unist’ot’en and Xolobeni, in Canada and
South Africa respectively, is compounded by a number of characteristics that make for an ideal

2

Defending Tomorrow: The climate crisis and threats against land and environmetnal defenders, by Global Witness
(2020); Criminalization of Human Rights Defenders, by Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15 (2015).
3
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, Report to the Human Rights Council, Thirtyninth session, Report to the Human Rights Council, Thirty-ninth session A/HRC/39/17 (2018).
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opportunity to examine, in a transnational and comparative way, the relationships between law,
jurisdiction, property, and self-determination in contexts of transitional justice. These ‘local’
conflicts are situated within a broader context of constitutionalism oriented toward transitional
justice, and the emerging legal space of consultation and consent in the context of resource
extraction.
The structural legal characteristics that frame each comparison include a Constitutional
entrenchment of human rights along with a commitment to transitional justice for previously
colonized peoples. In Canada the Charter of Rights and Freedoms became part of the
Constitution through the 1982 Constitution Act, where, in Section 35(1), Aboriginal and treaty
rights are recognized and affirmed, thus representing a recognition of Indigenous presence in
Canada prior to the arrival of settlers and the legitimacy of Indigenous legal orders and claims to
territory.4 In South Africa, customary law is protected in the 1996 Final Constitution. In the
landmark Richtersveld Constitutional Court judgement in South Africa, customary law is
recognized as a constitutionally protected and independent source of law on par with, however
distinct from, common law. The South African Constitution has been challenged, therefore, to
struggle with both formal and informal orders of law, contributing to possibly progressive
developments in ‘living law’.5
In addition to the Constitutional contexts that make for a productive comparison, the pace
of contemporary developments in law and policy on indigenous and rural peoples land rights is
extraordinary in both counties. In Canada, the Liberal government led by Justin Trudeau

4

See Patrick Macklem & Douglas Sanderson, “Introduction: Recognition and Reconciliation in Indigenous-Settler
Societies” in Patrick Macklem & Douglas Sanderson, eds, From recognition to reconciliation: essays on the
constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights (Toronto ; University of Toronto Press, 2016) 1.
5
Cornell, Drucilla. Law and revolution in South Africa: uBuntu, dignity, and the struggle for constitutional
transformation, 1st edition ed, Just ideas (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014).
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announced that reconciling the nation-to-nation relationship between First Nations and the
Canadian state is a key priority in 2015 and 2019; the research centre the Yellowhead Institute
has referred to the Trudeau Liberals as “the most active government on Indigenous issues in 100
years”.6 In South Africa post-apartheid legislation on mining, communal land rights, and tenure
reform are all currently being proposed, while social movements condemning the introduction of
legislation that they argue undermines rural land rights have organized protests attracting
thousands of people in early 2019.7 Resistance to newly introduced legislation in both places
reveals two states scrambling to contain indigenous resurgence and to maintain their control over
resources, territory, and the authority of law.
In both cases those resisting state-imposed extractive development are demanding that
their own forms of indigenous governance are respected on par with state-recognized forms of
government. ‘Traditional territories’ and ‘traditional councils’ (as protected by the 2003
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act in South Africa) are challenged by the
peoples of Xolobeni. In Unist’ot’en, the Wetsu’wet’en Hereditary chieftaincy continues their
150-year struggle to gain state recognition as separate from the jurisdiction of band councils, as
authorized by the Indian Act in Canada. In both Unist’ot’en and Xolobeni, peoples leverage
international Indigenous rights norms and link themselves with international movements as they
resist state-endorsed land dispossession for extractive activities. Thus the struggles for selfdetermination and rights over territory in Unist’ot’en and Xolobeni are illustrative of the
contemporary politics of indigeneity whereby previously colonized peoples are demanding
collective sovereignty and governance over territory through engagement with local, state, and

6

Yellowhead Institute, “Legislation Affecting Indigenous Peoples: An Overview of the Liberal Record”. Policy Brief
33, 28 June 2019. Available at www.yellowheadinstitute.org
7
See, for example, www.stopthebantustanbill.org (Cape Town, South Africa) and www.customcontested.co.za
(Cape Town, South Africa) for reporting on these movements.
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transnational law.8 By comparing the two struggles we can identify some of the characteristics of
emergent Indigenous and rural peoples rights to land and natural resources, and illustrate the
articulation of different human rights norms as they relate to assertions of collective rights to
territory.
What is specific about both of these case studies is the struggle over consultation and ‘the
right to consent’ – a legal principle informed by national and transnational law and Indigenous
peoples’ laws; a site of possibility, and a spatialized performance of proprietary relationships. It
is through the work of consultation that the state both facilitates resource extraction and
purportedly protects those impacted from its most harmful effects. Whereas both countries
promote land reform as a means of transitional justice and reconciliation, they also continue to
facilitate the definitive violence of the colonial period: dispossession. The role of law in these
processes is to cast the violence outside of itself and in the process normalize it. As this study
demonstrates, and as I explain in my methods, in conditions of Constitutional recognition of
Indigenous and customary land rights, purported political commitments to amend existing
legislation towards the goal of transitional justice, and the specific articulations of consultation
and consent, violence, jurisdiction, and property emerge as important concepts to examine
empirically. This thesis is an attempt to unpack the continuities and path dependencies between
the historical violence of settler colonialism and the new forms of violence that are performed
and experienced in the 21st century.

8

See Emily T Yeh & Joe Bryan, “Indigeneity” in James McCarthy, Gavin Bridge & Thomas Albert Perreault, eds,
Routledge Handb Polit Ecol Routledge international handbooks (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2015)
531; See also Sarah A Radcliffe, “Geography and indigeneity I: Indigeneity, coloniality and knowledge” (2017) 41:2
Prog Hum Geogr 220–229.
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Thesis roadmap
This thesis is composed of four chapters. In the first chapter I introduce briefly the struggles in
Xolobeni and Unist’ot’en and describe in detail the theoretical framework and methodology
developed through this research. The two chapters that follow are organized by country, Canada
and South Africa. The chapters have a general similarity in their organization, to the extent that
the first half of each is dedicated to explaining the legal architecture of ‘the right to consent’ to
resource extraction in each country. I explain the constitutional basis and provide a brief
overview of the jurisprudence that informs and undergirds these struggles. In Canada, I focus on
Aboriginal title and the duty to consult and accommodate respectively, and in South Africa I
focus on customary law and the emergent ‘right to say no’. The second half of each chapter
focuses on my case studies in Unist’ot’en and Xolobeni. I describe in each of the two chapters
the different ways that property is formulated in relation to jurisdiction, examine the constitutive
forms of legal violence in relation to both.

The law and politics of self-determination
Self-determination is an international human right recognized in Article 1(1) of both the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Social,
Economic and Cultural Rights, where it states that “All peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development”. It is both the means by which states are
identified and organized as sovereign states in relation to one another in International law, and a

6

concept through which Indigenous and subaltern peoples have been identified as ‘savage’ or
‘other’ and marginalized through colonization.9
Self-determination in international law is concerned with social beings, engaged in the
constitution of communities, rather than human beings as autonomous subjects.10 As Anaya
explains, the term ‘peoples’ is often understood in narrow, state-centric terms whereby ‘peoples’
are understood in dichotomous and mutually-exclusive ways in relation to the state. This limited
concept of ‘peoples’ “largely ignores the multiple, overlapping spheres of community, authority,
and interdependency that actually exist in the human experience”.11 He continues to explain,
“[t]he values of freedom and equality implicit in the concept of self-determination have meaning
for the multiple and overlapping spheres of human association and political ordering that
characterize humanity”.12 Finally, he makes an important distinction between constitutive and
remedial self-determination. Constitutive self-determination involves aspects of state building
and is owed to all peoples and their groups, and is therefore constitutive of state-building itself.
Remedial aspects of self-determination are meant to highlight that the right to self-determination
is for peoples who have been historically marginalized and therefore deserve remedial measures.
It is through the commitment to remedial self-determination that the politics of ‘recognition’ are
negotiated.
Struggles for self-determination are ridden with tensions. For some, self-determination is
simply another means by which the settler state determines the bounds within which ‘acceptable’
difference is defined. Self-determination is representative of liberal ‘recognition’ politics

9

See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge Studies in
International and Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
10
James Anaya, Indigenous peoples in international law (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 100.
11
Ibid. at 101.
12
Ibid. at 103.
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wherein the ‘harms’ of misrecognition are responded to and alleviated by the state on terms
determined by the state.13 Elizabeth Povinelli argues that liberal multicultural law and policy in
Australia further entrenches settler occupation by providing the limits of what is acceptable
cultural difference, and demanding that indigenous peoples represent their culture and their
history in ways that are considered legitimate to the Australian state and public.14 In her account,
law is one articulation of colonial sensibilities in the social and political realm; it participates in
and reaffirms discourses and textual practices that undermine Indigenous sovereignty. In the
context of liberal multiculturalism, Indigenous Peoples are drawn into the impossible position of
assuming an 'authentic' Indigenous subject position, hence the 'cunning of recognition'.15
State focused or governmentality approaches to recognition, such as Povinelli’s,
however, should not lead to a dead end whereby all struggles for recognition inherently lack
emancipatory potential; "we are likely to miss the most promising sources of the transformative
power of recognition if we focus... on the state as the agent of recognition and the subaltern
group as its recipient".16 Moreover, such an approach tends to assume that misrecognition leads
to a damaged subjectivity of subaltern groups, who in turn are struggling primarily for the
recognition of a state that has historically discriminated against them – in other words, those
misrecognized desire recognition in order to be full citizens in a polity.17

13

See Charles Taylor, Amy Gutmann & Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994).
14
Elizabeth A Povinelli, The cunning of recognition indigenous alterities and the making of Australian
multiculturalism, Politics, history, and culture (Duke University Press, 2002).
15
Ibid.
16
Melissa S Williams, “Introduction: On the use and abuse of recognition politics” in Avigail Eisenberg et al, eds,
Recognit Self-Determ Dilemmas Emancip Polit Ethnicity and democratic governance series (Vancouver, BC : UBC
Press, 2014) at 10.
17
Ibid. at 16.
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Glen Coulthard, of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation, argues that liberal politics of
recognition in Canada reproduce colonial logics aimed at dispossession of land. The politics of
recognition in the context of Canada, he argues, refers to "the now expansive range of
recognition-based models of liberal pluralism that seek to 'reconcile' Indigenous assertions of
nationhood with settler-state sovereignty via the accommodation of Indigenous identity claims in
some form of renewed legal and political relationship with the Canadian state".18 This broad
range of practices are entangled with settler-colonial power.
Self-determination is an important site of resistance, however, and is being re-cast and redefined through Indigenous resistance to ongoing forms of colonization. Audra Simpson argues
that there is an alternative to ‘recognition’, which is ‘refusal’. Simpson explains that refusal is a
“political and ethical stance that stands in stark contrast to the desire to have one’s
distinctiveness as a culture, as a people, recognized. Refusal comes with the requirement of
having one’s political sovereignty acknowledged and upheld”.19 Moreover, Simpson, along with
her collaborator Andrea Smith, argues "The politics of recognition entails a claim to uniqueness
that justifies recognition by the state... By contrast, the politics of decolonization requires the
building of mass movements capable of dismantling settler colonialism, white supremacy, and
capitalism".20 Coulthard argues that assertions of indigenous culture, as a ‘mode of life’, might
be central to struggles for indigenous sovereignty. One of the issues with the politics of
recognition is a reductionist understanding of ‘culture’, whereby ‘culture’ is understood in a way
similar to how Marxists understand class – as something to be transcended in the struggle for

18

Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: Univ Of
Minnesota Press, 2014) at 3.
19
Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States (Duke University Press:
Duke Univ Pr, 2014) at 11.
20
Audra Simpson & Andrea Smith, “Introduction” in Audra Simpson & Andrea Smith, eds, Theor Native Stud
(Durham ; Duke University Press, 2014) at 10.
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emancipation.21 He argues that cultural recognition has been central to Dene assertions of their
land rights, for example, explaining that Dene land claim proposals sought to protect a “mode of
life; a life on/with the land that stressed individual autonomy, collective responsibility, nonhierarchical authority, communal land tenure, and mutual aid”.22 I focus on law as one important
venue through which self-determinations’ recognition politics are revitalized. I am interested in
how the struggle for self-determination takes place in conditions of legal pluralism. I am not
denying the power of the state in perpetuating forms of settler-colonialism, I am emphasizing the
constitutive relationship between legal struggles and emergent forms of self-determination and
collective autonomy.
Understanding contemporary struggles for self-determination demands interrogating the
cumulative impacts of the legal processes that function through both a logic of erasure and
through processes of disaggregating the asserted authority of indigenous peoples. Through this
research I have come to understand self-determination – as a socio-legal positioning - as forged
through legal violence. This perspective is informed by each impacted community’s reporting of
violence and literature on legal violence in post-colonial conditions. Processes of erasure,
division and disruption are accomplished, in different ways, through the legal categories of
property and jurisdiction. One of the fundamental challenges to self-determination, I argue, is not
the imposing power of the state or a unified law, but rather the cumulative effects of legal
practices, discourses and ideologies that serve to divide and agitate, and to accomplish this in
such a way that the ‘divisions’ are the fault of Indigenous peoples and their communities.
The struggle for self-determination takes different forms and has different political
implications in particular places. In Canada, as I show, important legal categories through which

21
22

Coulthard, supra note 14 at 153.
Ibid. at 65.
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the international right of self-determination for Indigenous peoples is articulated include
Aboriginal rights and title and the duty to consult and accommodate. In South Africa there are a
range of collective rights claims that are informed by the right to self-determination, such as
group rights, the rights of Peoples, the right to autonomy, the right to development, and,
importantly, the constitutional protection of customary law. In both cases the international legal
norm of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) contained in the UNDRIP is articulated in
important ways to affirm rights over land and resources. The political contexts of the assertion of
the right to self-determination is explained in the respective country chapters. In this project I
often refer to both self-determination and collective autonomy to acknowledge that in South
Africa, due to the particular history and governance strategies used in the colonial and apartheid
eras, collective struggles for land and resource rights don’t often explicitly use the language of
self-determination. However, important legal categories, such as Aboriginal title and FPIC, are
used across both cases, indicating a common struggle against the contemporary state and its logic
of dispossession for resource extraction.
As I further explain below, legal violence against Peoples (as a collective) can be
identified through struggles over jurisdiction and property, which take place at multiple scales
and through many different actors. The contours and dynamics of self-determination are being
defined in these conditions. Indigenous peoples expose the settler-colonial logic still inherent in
legal processes, even in conditions of transnational legal pluralism wherein state law is not the
only authority, and through their work make significant gains in their claims to sovereignty.
Indigenous peoples often explain their encounter with the Canadian state and with
Canadian law as characterized by violence. While I provide evidence of this in both of the case
studies below, an innate violence in Canadian constitutionalism as described by Anishinaabe law

11

professor Aaron Mills is a useful starting point. Liberal constitutionalism, explains Mills, is
generated through a lifeworld characterized by earth-alienation. Mills argues that “[b]ecause of
liberalism’s view of persons as autonomous and because of its anthropocentric view that only
humans are persons, from my perspective it’s a worldview irredeemably committed to
violence”.23 This “violent constitutional foundation is hegemonic” argues Mills, limiting the
ability of Canadian law schools to engage in productive discussion beyond its grasp.24 This thesis
represents my efforts to understand empirically how forms of legal violence are manifest in
specific struggles and how Indigenous peoples assert their self-determination in response.

From ‘law’s violence’ to ‘legal violence’ in conditions of legal pluralism
Through my analysis of the ongoing struggles in Unist’ot’en and Xolobeni I have learned that in
both contexts the impacted communities routinely articulate that their experience with the state
and with state law is characterized by violence and conflict. The Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs
as well as the Unist’ot’en camp describe being in conflict with the law and legal processes; they
explain the violence they have endured at the hands of Coastal Gas Link (CGL) and the
government. In Xolobeni spokespeople for the ACC explain that the state parties and the
Australian mining company have caused irreparable harm and conflict in their community. They
mourn and remember community activists who have been assassinated in the struggle. By
explaining and articulating the violence they are subjected to, they are asserting their collective
rights and dignity and, I argue, affirming their collective identities against the violence they
experience. Their assertions of self-determination have a constitutive relationship with law’s

23

Aaron Mills, “The Lifeworlds of Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today” (2016) 61:4 McGill Law J Rev
Droit McGill at 865.
24
Ibid.
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contemporary violence. In order to understand the nature of this violence I explain below both
foundational literature on law and violence, and describe how I have come to understand
expressions of law and violence in conditions of legal pluralism. Jurisdiction and property, I
argue, are key categories via which law’s violence is expressed and spatialized, and therefore
important concepts in the present articulations of self-determination.
Jacques Derrida identifies violence in the very founding moment of law and describes
how violence is central to the performance of justice. He argues that no law exists without the
presumption of its enforcement, and further argues that this is the violent characteristic of law.
The reality of the relationship between law and enforcement tells us something about the
relationship between law and justice: to say that there is something called just, implies that it will
be followed up, enforced – “a powerless justice is not justice… justice without force is
contradictory”.25
Derrida also discusses a performative power to the inauguration of law. This is what he
calls mystical in the foundation of law:
The very emergence of justice and law, the founding and justifying moment
that institutes law implies a performative force, which is always an
interpretative force: this time not in the sense of law in the service of force, its
docile instrument, servile and thus exterior to the dominant power, but rather
in the sense of law that would maintain a more internal, more complex relation
with what one calls force, power or violence.26
Derrida’s argument opens up the opportunity to study how the relationship between law,
justice and violence is sustained, or as he calls it, conserved, through the ongoing actions of state
institutions. In addition to violence in the founding moment of law, he identifies a conserving

25

Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mythical Foundation of Authority’” in Drucilla Cornell et al, eds,
Deconstruction Possibility Justice (New York: Routledge, 1992) at ll.
26
Ibid. at 13.
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violence in the maintenance that ensures the permanence and enforceability of law.27 He explains
that police mix these two forms of violence: “the police are no longer content to enforce the law,
and thus to conserve it; they invent it, they give public ordinances, they intervene whenever the
legal situation isn’t clear to guarantee security”.28 He refers to the conserving aspect of law’s
violence as iterative. Iteration, he explains, preserves the foundation of law. For example, in case
law, law is always re-iterated, and through this act the very foundation of law, including the
violence, forceful, foundation of law, is re-created.29 He argues, "this law of iterability that
insures that the founding violence is constantly represented in a conservative violence that
always repeats the tradition of its origin and that ultimately keeps nothing but a foundation
destined from the start to be repeated, conserved, reinstituted".30
Law’s violence operates performatively and iteratively through the ways that peoples
make sense of, justify, and interpret the violence of law in its enforcement. Law’s violence is not
a specific, self-contained moment (however it may come into sharp focus at particular moments),
but an ongoing process, a practice. Peter Fitzpatrick argues that modern law is myth that is lived,
performed, and practiced, and, importantly, sustained through a narrative myth of progression. It
is through (in part) narratives of linear progress that ‘the West’ has created the mythology of
modern law. Fitzpatrick explains: “narrative is a simple mode of mastery characteristic of the
West. Through narrative, in mythic style, order is created and sustained in tightly linear and
irreversible sequences flowing from an origin or an original transition. Through narrative,
progressive domination and hierarchy integrally correspond to the sequence’s forward thrust”.31
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Law’s violence is thus justified by the myth that its enforcement is necessary for the imagined
movement of progress. It is partly this pairing of law and progress that aligns so easily with the
belief in the ‘rule of law’ in the context of resource extractive development.
A few key authors demonstrate how law’s violence can be studied through the practices
and discourses of the legal system; their insights are important for developing an understanding
of how to study legal violence empirically. Robert Cover explains how law’s violence is carried
out, sustained, through the work of a range of actors – indeed the coordinated work of a range of
actors allows for the dispersion of law’s violence to the extent that it is difficult to pinpoint and
bracket a particular agent in the expression of law’s violence. The social organization of
violence is structured in such a way that in order to carry out law’s violence “safely and
effectively, responsibility for the violence must be shared; law must operate as a system of cues
and signals to many actors who would otherwise be unwilling, incapable or irresponsible in their
violent acts”.32 He identifies violence in the interpretive work of judges; which, however central
to law’s violence, is disconnected from the violence needed to enforce a judgement – “we have
rigidly separated the act of interpretation – of understanding what ought to be done – from the
carrying out of this “out to be done” through violence”.33 Again, we see how law’s violence is
revealed and conserved through the continuing acts and practices of law.
Austin Sarat studies how law’s violence is articulated through legal discourse. He
describes that the language of law does a double deed: First, it identifies in detail and clarity the
violence that is outside of it; that which demands retribution. Second, it mutes other kinds of
violence – ie structural violence, and racialized violence. Sarat focuses on the representational
practices and discursive modes used to “speak about violence inside and outside the law”. He
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argues: “violence is put into discourse, and distinctions between the violence of law and violence
outside the law are richly marked”.34
One of the significant limits of these accounts of law’s violence for the present purposes
is that they tend to focus on law and violence in the criminal justice system, and in particular on
law and violence as it is realized in trials against individuals. What makes the relationship
between law and violence significant in the post-colonial context is the fact that it is expressed at
a collective, not only individuals. Law, in other words, is central to the ongoing project of settlercolonialism. Patrick Wolfe develops a theory of settler colonialism that focuses on its structural
and ongoing characteristics. He argues that settler colonialism is not a singular event, but rather
an ongoing social formation motivated by a logic of elimination. He describes settler colonialism
“both as complex social formation and as continuity through time… a structure rather than an
event”.35 Narrating contemporary conditions of settler colonialism, explains Wolfe, “involves
charting the continuities, discontinuities, adjustments, and departures whereby a logic that
initially informed frontier killing transmutes into different modalities, discourses and
institutional formations as it undergirds the historical development and complexification of
settler society. This is not a hierarchical procedure”.36 The violence of settler colonialism is
precisely in the logic of elimination, the primary motive for which is territory: “territoriality is
settler colonialism's specific irreducible element”.37
As a settler researcher and academic, studying law’s violence is a way for me to
understand how a legal system and government perpetuates violence against First Nations. By
understanding contemporary articulations of legal violence, I can also understand how
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Indigenous peoples are asserting and identifying themselves against this violence. I might gain a
deeper understanding of the contours of self-determination in conditions of settler-colonialism.

Defining legal violence in a paragraph
Legal violence refers to instances where harm against collectivities is legitimated by law. It is not
an innate force within law. It is structural violence that is realized against Indigenous or
previously colonized peoples who assert their own forms of law against ‘modern’ state law.
Legal violence is derivative of the colonial encounter, whereby modern law was used to
distinguish the presumed savage other from colonizers. Legal violence exists in conditions of
legal pluralism and therefore is not tied to a view of a homogeneous state. In this thesis it is
realized and expressed through legal presumptions of jurisdiction and articulations of property.

Geographies of legal violence: Jurisdiction, property, and ‘inter-communal’ conflict
Settler-colonialism has a key geographical element. As I demonstrate empirically in the case
studies of Unist’ot’en and Xolobeni, law’s colonial violence is expressed geographically through
jurisdiction and property. Struggles over property are also territorial. I elaborate on these
concepts individually below. Jurisdiction and property are means via which law’s historical
colonial violence is re-articulated, or iterated to use Derrida’s term, today. Property and
jurisdiction, I argue, are useful for understanding the different ways the constitutive relationship
between self-determination and law’s violence is realized in conjuncture. Below I briefly explain
my approach to both property and jurisdiction. I return to both concepts throughout the thesis,
when they emerge as useful through the archive.
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Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is often assumed to be a mundane aspect of law and governance and often escapes
rigorous critique. Many, in Canada for example, will understand jurisdiction in relation to tiers of
government: municipalities, provinces, and the federal government are imagined in a hierarchical
structure whereby different responsibilities are distributed over specific demarcated spaces. In
international law, jurisdiction refers most generally to the territorial sovereignty of nation-states.
Jurisdiction however is a concept that has been gaining currency in critical legal scholarship in
the past decade. Studies of jurisdiction unsettle the idea that jurisdiction is a naturalized fact - a
technical register that represents a true ‘anti-politics machine’ – and examines the often
unquestioned means by which jurisdiction differentiates and organizes “the where, the who, the
what, and the how of governance”.38 Jurisdiction is indeed a site of contestation and, as the
authors reviewed below demonstrate, there are a number of different ways to interrogate what
often goes unquestioned about the origins and contemporary role of jurisdiction and its
relationship to legal practices.
Jurisdiction can be understood in two parts, as the legal rule (juris), and as a speech act
(diction), the later of which inaugurates law through the act of claiming. In this way it is
continuously performed into being. Legal philosopher Costas Douzinas explains jurisdiction as
an ongoing speech-act that both creates and perpetuates the assumed natural legitimacy of
jurisdiction: "As a double generative, jurisdiction, law's speech, has two aspects, which are
inescapably intertwined. It refers both to the diction that speaks the law - law's inauguration
through words - and law's speech - what the inaugurated law says".39 Shaunnagh Dorsett and
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Shaun McVeigh describe jurisdiction, in terms of a foundational proclamation, in a similar way
to Douzinas. They explain that jurisdiction “connotes authority”, and argue that “it is an act of
speaking – of declaring law”.40 By ‘act of speaking’, the authors are referring to a wide spectrum
of knowledges and practices of law. To explain the net effect of jurisdiction, they refer to it as an
“idiom” and a “language and style of talking about law”.41
By attending to jurisdiction, argues legal anthropologist Justin Richland, researchers are
“redirected toward understanding sovereignty as an active undertaking and moreover one that is
getting (re)constituted in the unfolding, unstable pragmatics of the present”.42 Jurisdiction is
constituted through the relation between law and language, which generate a “narrative timespace” that Richland refers to as “law’s perpetuity”,43 referring to the production of an a-political
and a-historical character of jurisdictional claims. Thus, jurisdiction can be understood as the
founding moment of the authority of law as well as its ongoing articulation.
Despite the draw to develop a ‘theory’ of jurisdiction, such an attempt will produce
diminishing returns as the processes and practices through which jurisdiction can be studied are
multiple and beyond generalization. For example, ‘speech acts’ are only one means by which
jurisdiction is constituted. Dorsett and McVeigh describe the practice of jurisdiction through a
number of different means. They refer to jurisdiction as a technology of law, a practical and
technical activity that can be thought of “as practice, device, technique and organizational
strategy”.44 More specifically, they refer to the many technical and material forms of
jurisdictional practice and their relationship to the production and constitution of “lawful

40

Shaunnagh Dorsett & Shaun McVeigh, Jurisdiction, Critical approaches to law (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY:
Routledge, 2012) at 4.
41
Ibid. at 5.
42
Justin B Richland, “Jurisdiction: Grounding Law in Language” (2013) 42:1 Annu Rev Anthropol at 213.
43
Ibid. at 219.
44
Dorsett & McVeigh, supra note 40. At 14.

19

relations”.45 Rather than developing a theory of jurisdiction, the authors examine the enactments
and practices of jurisdiction; they organized “the repertoires of jurisdiction into a form of
jurisprudence – a way of approaching law as a technology or as a material engagement of lawful
relations”.46
Jurisdiction represents a site of struggle wherein there are a plurality of forms of
jurisdictional orders.47 The study of jurisdiction is a study of practice, “a way of doing things
rather than a completed or idea form”48 through which "we need to be attentive to the nodes of
connection where authorities meet and where conflict may or may not be reconciled".49 A key
point is that whatever the ‘scale’ of analysis – from international law to municipal governance –
claims to jurisdiction represent assertions of the authority to identify and inaugurate law. Studies
of jurisdiction examine jurisdiction as a practice, such as the daily legal technicalities by which
jurisdiction is adhered to and produced.
Work by international law scholar Sundhya Pahuja is instructive. In her article, Laws of
encounter: a jurisdictional account of international law,50 Pahuja suggests that resource conflicts
involving communities, mining companies, non-governmental organizations, and states might be
read as conflicts between rival jurisdictions, rather than social, economic, or political conflicts.
One of the methodological and conceptual gains of this perspective is to bring into focus "the
conduct of those exercising jurisdiction in the present", which includes the ongoing actualization
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of statehood and the sovereign claim of the nation-state .51 For Pahuja, jurisdiction is an
orientation, a way of reading a conflict, not a framework or theory. It therefore “invites showing,
not telling, doing, not definition".52 What she calls ‘jurisdictional thinking’ is also helpful in that
it allows us to be “agnostic about the normative basis on which the claim to authority rests. Its
primary concern is with how - the ways in which , the practices by which, and the technical
means by which - that authority is exercised and lawful relations are conducted”.53 In this
formulation practice is the focus of the examination of lawful relations between rival
jurisdictions.
Jurisdiction emerges as an important optic by which to understand the emergence of
struggles over territory and assertions of self-determination throughout this thesis. My approach
here is to understand the conditions in which jurisdiction is an important front in struggle, and to
interrogate the ways that peoples in Xolobeni and Unist’ot’en resist state assertions of
jurisdictions, and in response affirm their own jurisdictions, and the forms of self-determination
that are declared in response.

Property
Property, I argue, is articulated in different ways in each case study in relation to assertions of
jurisdiction. A ‘classical’ conception of property aligns closely with a formalist legal perspective,
to the extent that it is imagined as a stable category defined by, and protected by, a formalist
rule-based legal system. The classical conception focuses on the property rights of owners,
determines their relations to others regarding particular objects of value. This conception often
uses the metaphor of a ‘bundle of rights’ to describe the various rights and responsibilities
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ascribed to owners.54 The problem with dominant or centralized property paradigms are that
“these focal points have all too often kept us from viewing property from those subject positions
that the formal laws of property treat as secondary or ill defined”.55 Researchers in the social
sciences, particularly in anthropology and geography, challenge the classical conception that
prioritizes owners and their ‘bundle of rights’ to consider property as sets of relationships that
are negotiated and contested, unstable and influenced by the claims and struggles of the nonowners; of those usually marginalized or overlooked in the classical conception. A socio-legal
approach to real property in land (the disciplinary approach developed in this thesis) draws from
law and engages with a broad interdisciplinary set of scholarship. It is work that is both
theoretically and empirically informed, examines the ways that property is co-constituted
through law, and considers as a primary concern the power relations that contribute to the
constitution of property regimes.56
Anthropologists von Benda-Beckman et al. provide a broad description of property and
focus more specifically on the categories that can be used to examine property relations, and
their shifting character from multiple perspectives, empirically. For the authors, "property
concerns the organization and legitimation of rights and obligations with respect to goods that
are regarded as valuable".57 Approaching property as an empirical site, they find that "Property
regimes... cannot easily be captured in one-dimensional political, economic or legal models".58
Property is best understood as an analytic category that can be divided into for different and
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overlapping layers: ideologies, legal systems, actual social relationships, and social practice.59
Breaking down property in this way contributes some empirical nuance to the proverbial ‘bundle
of rights’ that is often used to describe property relations. They consider how rights in relation to
objects are imagined, practiced, and institutionalized. This introduces sub-themes within studies
of property and highlights that property can be approached in many ways and at different
theoretical levels. These are the basic layers, they argue, that help us understand property in
conditions of legal plurality. In these conditions, changes in property relations at different layers
are constitutive of changes at others; change may be initiated at a specific layer, but that change
will feed back into other layers leading to “imbricated adjustments”: "once we have understood
the characteristics of these loops of influence within the layers of property regimes and in their
wider contexts, we can begin to understand the relationship between specific property categories
and political, economic or ecological change".60 This perspective of changes in property is key to
understanding contested property regimes as an empirical site.
As I argue and demonstrate throughout this thesis, law’s violence is articulated and
materialized through property, and more particularly, real property in land. Prominent legal
geographer Nicholas Blomley argues in a seminal article that “violence plays an integral role in
the legitimation, foundation, and operation of a regime of private property” and further argues
“that there is an intrinsic and consequential geography to law’s violence as it relates to private
property”.61 For Blomley, violence is intrinsic to the realization of law: “The establishment of a
Western liberal property regime was both the point of these violences and the means by which
violent forms of regulation were enacted and reproduced. Space, property, and violence were
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performed simultaneously”.62 In support of his argument he focuses on three spatializations – the
frontier, the survey, and the grid – and explains how each of these spatializations are central to
the unfolding of colonization and the introduction of exclusive private property through violence
means. The frontier, the survey, and the grid, as specific spatializations, are “contextual and
contingent, rather than a transcendental force”.63
The materiality of law’s violence is expressed through real property. In consideration of
the fact that we are all always suspended in some kind of property relationship,64 and that these
relationships can be understood along a hierarchical spectrum of property rights,65 the
relationship between violence and property is dispersed and uneven. The conceptual nuance
added to a centralized property paradigm is key here, and I unpack it in my discussion of
Aboriginal title and the duty to consult in chapter two. I am not concerned primarily with a
singular act of dispossession whereby peoples are physically forced from their lands. Indeed, in
each of my case studies the threatened peoples have not been dispossessed. Yet there are
multiple ways by which property rights are undermined, limited, or degraded, contributing to
conditions of insecurity whereby dispossession is a constant possibility.
These conditions are well illustrated by Robert Nichols, who argues that dispossession is
realized through a recursive process constituted by micro-acts that build on one another over
time. He explains of the colonial period in the Americas, "[d]ispossession did not proceed
through macro assertions of sovereignty but through microlevel practices that worked to
dismantle one infrastructure of life and replace it with another" (Nichols 2020, 45).
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Dispossession refers to “a process in which new proprietary relations are generated by under
structural conditions that demand their simultaneous negation” (Nichols 2020, 8). I am
concerned with identifying legal violence before (and often leading to) property dispossession.

Territorializing conflict
In the following analysis it is important to make a distinction between jurisdiction and territory.
In their work on jurisdiction, Dorsett and McVeigh use a concept of territory that is often
inseparable from jurisdiction; rather, territory refers to a specific spatial expression of
jurisdiction rather than a form of authority and governance that might exist as distinct from
processes and practices of jurisdiction. More specifically, territory is used as a strictly legal
concept which gives spatial form to law.66 While their understanding of territory is useful for
their purposes, it has limits as soon as you move beyond the state and consider transnational or
non-state jurisdictional claims (points I elaborate at the end of chapters two and three on
‘alternative legal geographies’). The concept of ‘territory’ is helpful in this regard.
In a landmark paper, geographers Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Peluso unsettle
assumptions about state territory as uniform and focus instead on processes and practices of
internal forms of territorialisation whereby the state uses different administrations to determine
the distribution of resource access rights. They introduce the study of territoriality to examine the
governance of people and resources within particular spaces.67 Scholars have expanded on this
concept to investigate processes of territorialisation beyond the state, referring to a deepening of
administrative and governance authority by a range of actors, both internal state actors and non-
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governmental organizations, within specific spaces.68 Importantly, some understand
territorialisation as not only about the control of resources within a demarcated space, but also
about the production of the authority to determine access to resources.69 Political ecologists
argue that territorialization “is no less than power relations written on land” whereby a claim is
made to land; “not always a state claim, but a collaborative claim”.70 These approaches are
distinct from understanding territory as a clearly defined and unchanging space claimed by a
monolithic state.
Practices of jurisdiction, and the lawful relations that characterize the encounter between
rival jurisdictions, are a means by which different authorities are granted degrees of control over
particular decisions within a demarcated space. In relation to legal violence and the
narrativization of conflict, state jurisdictions can be legitimated and authorized through the
territorialization of conflict to the extent that the identification of an ‘inter-communal conflict’
justifies (to the state) violent interventions. Therefore, the concern is not only a clash of
jurisdictional claims to authority, it is the territorializing effects of power relations that legitimate
particular legal responses and the ways that conflict is territorialized as ‘internal’ to the groups
threatened with dispossession. The phrase ‘inter-communal conflict’ is a rendering of conflict as
emergent from a localized collectivity. The localization of conflict as ‘inter-communal’ is an
effect of law’s claim to sovereignty and authority over state territory. It is a narrative rendering
of conflict as derivative from a specific locale, rather than as a consequence of a cross-territorial
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infrastructure development. In other words, ‘inter-communal conflict’ emerges within a wider
legal geography of state claims to jurisdiction.

Method in three parts:
1) Contested property regimes as an empirical site
In their edited volume, Patrick J.L. Cockburn et al. (2018) focus on ‘contested property regimes’
in an effort to consider how property relations, and the power relations that protect and reproduce
colonial property relations, are contingent. They explain, “property regimes do not always run
smoothly. They are not merely accepted but also contested, ignored, circumvented, and
strategically manipulated”.71 For the authors, contested property regimes refer to “attempts to
mobilize a vision of property in order to reproduce or reorganise property relations”.72 The
concept is based on two key ideas, explain the authors: “the idea that property is established via
processes of communication between social actors” and “this communication can be, and often
is, deeply confrontational and does not always lead to mutual recognition”.73
The authors however focus almost exclusively on specific property struggles within
national context, and largely ignore the extent to which localized property struggles are often
also connected to networks of transnational capital and transnational legal norms, including
human rights and indigenous rights norms. Similarly focusing on property contestations, Scott
Prudham and William Coleman, as well as their collaborating authors, focus on property regimes
at crisis points in global context, and examine specifically the articulations of collective
autonomy and territorial control that emerge through property contestations. They explain,
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“Property regimes at crisis points are sites of friction, conflict, and resistance in which global
capitalism and international authority supported by global law are engaged by local actors
through a politics of place”.74 The collaborating authors in the book “approach property as
relational sets of rights distributed among individuals and groups in ways that make existing
property regimes and claims specific, limited, and frequently, shared. We therefore view the
assertion of property claims by individuals or groups as being central to notions of autonomy”.75
Thus it is through property contestations that peoples assert and define their autonomy.

2) Documenting consultation
My empirical analysis of these ongoing struggles includes examining jurisprudence on ‘the right
to consent’, state policy, reports by non-governmental organizations, websites and public
statements published by the impacted communities, court submissions in litigation, and news
reports and commentary. For this research I have assembled contemporary archives of the
struggle in the qualitative research software Nvivo. Archives include new reports, government
legislation and policy, jurisprudence, statements from Indigenous led and non-Indigenous nongovernmental organizations, as well as my own ‘field notes’ taken during my research in
Xolobeni (during my dissertation field work) and during my participation in public protests in
support of the Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs in Toronto.
The similarity – in terms of language, legal norms and indicators - of the archives of
material that I have assembled about the struggles in Xolobeni and Unist’ot’en is revealing.
These archives about specific places are transnational in that they are constituted by legal norms
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and legal knowledges that do not belong to specific territorialized states. The actors who
constitute the archives are often not national actors – they are actors from many different places
who have learned to use the language of law in a way that is specific to the area that it is
practiced. Reading these two archives together reveals different paradigms of settler-colonial and
post-colonial struggle. That is, different ways that those resisting extraction identify themselves
and describe their relationships to land. The nature of autonomy, I show, is distinct.
Through my research I am continuously curating an archive. Collecting news stories.
Examining legal documents. Reading transcripts from debates about legislation. The process of
building an archive never stops. These documents are a rich archive of material and are used in
this research in an attempt to elevate the voices and experiences of the people at the centre of the
struggle. I use qualitative research software Nvivo to code the material, however my engagement
is better characterized as an “ethnographic imaginary” as I probe the conjuncture of forces
present in the study.76 I draw from community descriptions of tactics and practices used to assert
their collective solidarity, as well as their reporting of violence. Critically reading these archives
reveals deeply contested government practices, precarious claims to jurisdiction, and,
importantly, narratives of conflict and violence.

3) Transnational and comparative
While struggles for self-determination are emergent through transnational organizing, and
constitutive of transnational legal norms (such as FPIC), they are articulated in relation to
particular property norms in specific places. In this respect the framework developed by Ananya
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Roy, in her article ‘Paradigms of Propertied Citizenship’, is insightful. Roy uses a transnational
framework to re-direct questions traditionally used in scholarship in the ‘Third World’ to ‘First
World’ case studies, “thereby interrogating norms of citizenship and making possible new
intellectual and political pathways".77 She draws from the seminal work by geographer Doreen
Massey who describes places as “articulated moments in networks of social relations and
understandings”.78 Transnationalism, argues Roy, can be an “interrogative technique that
reworks the interface of First and Third Worlds”.79 Roy identifies for example how squatting in
Calcutta, India, has associated with it alternative paradigms of propertied citizenship, whereby
peoples feel that they have the right as citizens to build their homes in informal settlements.
Squatting in the US, however, is associated with a different paradigm of citizenship, the structure
of rights and associated meanings cast peoples outside of the realm of citizenship.80
Roy’s comparative work is used to both distinguish between different property paradigms
in India and the US, and to read the tactics of social movements that are responding to the
particular grammar and articulations of property in their respective places. She explains the
analytical purchase of this comparative work on property and resistance: “By situating such
strategies and their hazards in a global context, a transnational framework exposes the
scaffolding of norms and meanings that constitute a distinctive American notion of shelter,
property, and citizenship. At the same time, it does not guarantee an optimistic alternative that
can be effortlessly borrowed from elsewhere".81 Moreover, "a transnational epistemology
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provides the cartographic tools for mapping multiple pathways of rights and claims".82 Thus we
are inspired to ask how are social movements articulating their claims to rights in relation to the
specific places of their struggles?
The questions are useful for my work in Unist’ot’en and Xolobeni. In previous work I
have described what I call the articulations of Indigeneity, customary law, and Aboriginal title in
South African land restitution, charting the development of ‘custom’ in relation to transnational
legal norms.83 In the Xolobeni judgement,84 which can be identified as one of the most recent
significant judgements on what is called ‘living customary law’ in the South African context, the
courts upheld custom because to ignore it would be to re-produce the racist history of common
law and its colonial work of distinguishing between the colonized and the colonizer – the modern
subject of citizenship and the backward, savage, other. The judgement provides an important
opportunity to ask how legal struggles and litigation in Canada might take on a different
character if the focus was less on proving historical occupation of territory (a problematic
approach that ‘freezes’ an ahistorical account of indigenous traditions, as explained below) and
focuses instead on the identification and transformation of racist ontologies in Canadian law.
Following Geographer Gillian Hart, transnational work on property might demonstrate how
"bringing diverse but connected historical geographies into tension with one another helps to
render taken for granted categories peculiar and open to question, as well as pointing to new
connections, claims, and re-articulations".85 What I attempt in this paper is better understood as a
‘cross-contextual analysis’ rather than a comparison that seeks to identify simply the different

82

Ibid.
Daniel Huizenga, “Articulations of Aboriginal Title, Indigenous Rights, and Living Customary Law in South Africa”
(2018) 27:1 Soc Leg Stud 3–24.
84
Baleni and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Others 2018 73768/2016 (HC)
85
Gillian Hart, “Denaturalizing Dispossession: Critical Ethnography in the Age of Resurgent Imperialism” (2006)
38:5 Antipode at 996.
83

31

ways that each case is similar or different. In the analysis I highlight both difference and
linkages; the ways that how the struggles diverge and how there is clear overlap.86
Is there really enough ground to justify a comparison between South Africa and Canada?
South Africa, for example, is one of the most unequal countries on earth. The disparities in
wealth are striking and an assault on human dignity. Homicide rates are the highest of any
country not in civil war. Corruption has arguably consumed government (see state capture
report). The land reform program is widely understood to have failed and in 2019 the ANC
began a process to begin amending the Constitution to allow for the expropriation of land
without compensation. While inequalities are rising in Canada and racialized peoples experience
poverty at a much higher rate than white people, the disparities are not really comparable.
However, if one is to look specifically at the relations between the Canadian state and
historically colonized populations – First Nations, Métis, and Inuit – the picture looks much
different.
Andrew Orkin, who was born in and spent his early life in apartheid South Africa before
moving to Canada and becoming a lawyer to represent Aboriginal peoples, wrote in 2003 about
the break down of law in Canada in relation to Aboriginal peoples. He demonstrates that despite
Section 35 of the Constitution Act and progressive jurisprudence ‘recognizing’ Aboriginal
treaties and rights, a history of violent dispossession and cultural genocide continues. He
explains,
Aboriginal peoples have been and are being internally colonized in Canada,
through a long, deliberate and ongoing process of cultural suppression,
dispossession, breach of promise and trust, legislative and other oppression,
as well as state and public discrimination and violence. Fundamentally,
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Aboriginal peoples have never freely consented to their collective
dispossession through the wholesale taking of their traditional lands and
resources across this land, the debilitating effects of which are truly
extraordinary in a highly developed country such as Canada.87
Furthermore he argues that "courts' applications of the Rule of Law and the supreme law of the
land going into the twenty-first century unfortunately still serves on balance as a very blunt
instrument for the dispossession and subjugation of Aboriginal peoples".88 Orkin therefore finds
clear comparisons in histories of racialized dispossession in both countries. Yet, more important
than a shared history of colonial violence is a shared history of Indigenous and rural peoples
survival against the settler state. Xolobeni and Unist’ot’en are clear examples of this survival.
“Assimilation policies failed because Aboriginal people have the secret of cultural survival”.89 It
is precisely their survival and resilience that made the analysis in this paper possible.
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Chapter 2: Jurisdiction, property, and conflict in the Wet’suwet’en struggle for
sovereignty
Introduction
In this chapter I focus on the ongoing struggle for Indigenous sovereignty in Wet’suwet’en,
unceded territory within the boundaries of British Columbia. I illustrate the relationships
between legal violence and self-determination, as it is realized through struggles over jurisdiction
and property. I further illustrate how knowledge about conflict is produced in relation to these
categories. In these conditions, as I show, conflict and violence are imagined to exist outside the
state and Canadian law while political disagreements among First Nations groups are rendered as
‘inter-communal’ conflict. The analysis demonstrates how state actors perpetuate new forms of
conflict through alleged attempts at transitional justice and reconciliation. The narrative that I
provide of the events and dynamics in Wet’suwet’en positions this ongoing struggle in relation to
the context of Constitutional commitments to the recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal
rights and title, jurisprudence on the duty to consult, descriptions of violence by the
Wet’suwet’en Hereditary leadership, and the state and non-state actors who participate in these
legal and political negotiations.
On 31 December 2019, the Federal Court of Appeal released a decision upholding an
interlocutory injunction against the Wet’suwet’en, ordering them to remove a blockade at
Unist’ot’en. The blockade was built by Wet’suwet’en peoples to stop workers for Coastal
GasLinks (CGL) from entering their territory and continuing work on a Natural Gas Pipeline that
is being built through their territory. On 4 January 2020 the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Leadership
released a statement that provides an overview of many of the dynamics that characterize the
struggle in Unist’ot’en. The statement, below, references the key issues that I address and
elaborate beyond this powerful pronouncement, including the Delgamuukw decision, the duty to
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consult and Aboriginal title, Wet’suwet’en law and identity, criminalization, traditional
territories, FPIC, and UNDRIP:
“Canada’s courts have acknowledged in Delgamuukw-Gisdaywa v. The Queen
that the Wet’suwet’en people, represented by our hereditary chiefs, have never
ceded nor surrendered title to the 22,000km2 of Wet’suwet’en territory. The
granting of the interlocutory injunction by BC’s Supreme Court has proven to
us that Canadian courts will ignore their own rulings and deny our jurisdiction
when convenient, and will not protect our territories or our rights as
Indigenous peoples.
Anuc ‘nu’at’en (Wet’suwet’en law) is not a “belief” or a “point of view”. It is
a way of sustainably managing our territories and relations with one another
and the world around us, and it has worked for millennia to keep our
territories intact. Our law is central to our identity. The ongoing
criminalization of our laws by Canada’s courts and industrial police is an
attempt at genocide, an attempt to extinguish Wet’suwet’en identity itself.
We reaffirm that Anuc ‘nu’at’en remains the highest law on Wet’suwet’en land
and must be respected. We have always held the responsibility and authority to
protect our unceded territories. Protection of our yintah (traditional
territories) is at the heart of Anuc ‘nu’at’en, and we will practice our laws for
the future generations.
The Wet’suwet’en have always controlled access to our territories. At
Unist’ot’en Village, a Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) protocol has
been practiced over the past ten years whenever access to the territory is
requested by someone outside of Dark House membership. Dark House has not
been able to implement this protocol since the enforcement of the interim
injunction in January 2019. This protocol aligns Wet’suwet’en law with the
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which guarantees
Indigenous peoples the right to obtain free, prior, and informed consent for
development on our territories” (Unist’ot’en Camp, 4 Jan 2020).
In this statement we read the identification of colonial violence – “The ongoing criminalization
of our laws by Canada’s courts and industrial police is an attempt at genocide” – as well as a
description of Indigenous law that extends beyond the specific place of struggle: Wet’suwet’en
law is aligned with UNDRIP. The importance of aligning with the gains and language of the
international Indigenous rights movement is clear. By aligning with UNDRIP, the Wet’suwet’en
continue the efforts of Indigenous peoples internationally to challenge the state-centred
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international legal order whereby in order to have standing one has to take the form of a
‘sovereign’ nation-state. As Kent McNeil explains, “Indigenous peoples played no part in…
formulating the… international law principle that sovereignty is vested in nation states”.90 By
aligning with the international legal order under UNDRIP the Wet’suwet’en effectively draw
into focus the need to establish nation-to-nation relations between the Wet’suwet’en and the
Canadian state.
The statement above is a powerful assertion of Indigenous sovereignty and a rebuke of
the settler state and its practices of dispossession. The Wet’suwet’en are inviting Canada into a
nation-to-nation relationship, yet the jurisprudence and legal practice operates to cast them as
outsiders – and as agitators of disruption and conflict. The chapter is organized as follows: first I
explain the legal architecture that has been forming towards the realization of the right to selfdetermination via Aboriginal title and the duty to consult, then I explain the specific struggle in
Wet’suwet’en and the issues that this struggle raises.

The legal architecture of the right to consultation and consent in Canada
The legal architecture built around the right to consultation and consent serves to channel the
flow of authority and legitimacy between Indigenous Peoples and the Crown and to render it as
either amounting to a right to be consulted, or to consent, which would include the power of
Indigenous Peoples to deny and effectively stop projects that they disagree with. The distinction
between the right to consent and the right to consultation can be understood through different
renderings of these struggles as a concern of property, and therefore amendable to consultation,
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or as a struggle over jurisdiction, thus demanding a stronger right of consent. As I explain below,
while Aboriginal rights and title, as recognized and affirmed in Section 35(1) of the 1982
Constitution Act, are often leveraged by Indigenous Peoples as an issue of jurisdictional
authority, they are most often rendered as an issue of property. Constitutional law scholar Jeremy
Webber argues that there are different ways that Aboriginal title is understood by different
actors. For judges, the issue at stake is a proprietary right over land. For indigenous peoples,
however, Aboriginal title concerns self-determination and self-governance. He further explains
that the notion that Aboriginal issues in the Constitution concern the issue of rights is misleading.
In reality, Aboriginal issues are a question of federalism.91 This has to do with the fact that
Aboriginal title law has historically emerged in Canada with property characteristics and in
effect ignores indigenous jurisdiction.92 As I demonstrate, in assertions of Aboriginal title by the
Wet’suwet’en this distinction is apparent. Their concern is not with protecting a specific
proprietary interest, it is in asserting their jurisdiction and authority over their territory. Thus, this
is a struggle over competing jurisdictions. In this section I describe the contours and
contestations around jurisdictional and proprietary interests in the legal architecture of the right
to consultation and consent.

Aboriginal title
Critics of Aboriginal title have very different interpretations of its generative capacity – has the
legal category been restrained by a colonial path-dependence that will uphold the sovereignty of
the Crown and open Indigenous lands for extractive development without fail? Or is Aboriginal
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title a fundamental legal category indispensable in the struggle for indigenous sovereignty? John
Borrows argues that Aboriginal title jurisprudence in Canada develops and relies on a particular
idea of history, whereby the courts rely on a kind of originalism at odds with the living tree
doctrine in Constitutionalism. He explains,
The agency of Aboriginal communities is disciplined by deeper structural
forces that call on history to patrol the borders of our legal imagination.
Aboriginal rights have been simultaneously enriched and constrained by a
powerful quasi-historical approach to legal interpretation. Originalism
privileges ‘‘frozen-in-time’’ moments of a problematic past in defining
contemporary constitutional protections. Originalism’s alternative – living
constitutionalism – is pushed aside. Attempts to organically incorporate
rolling insights about law’s relationship to history are generally not a part of
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence.93
Brian Slattery argues the opposite, however, finding that principles of reconciliation are
embedded in the Constitution and have emerged through Aboriginal title jurisprudence. Section
35(1), he explains, states that existing Aboriginal and treaty rights are recognized and affirmed,
language that points to its reconciliatory orientation. Recognition, he posits, refers to the fact that
Aboriginal rights are protected due to their historical existence, however affirmation refers to the
future-oriented spirit of the Constitution. ‘Affirmation’ refers to principles of reconciliation that
“govern the legal effects of Aboriginal rights in modern times” and take into account the
contemporary expressions of Indigenous cultures and the conditions in which they are being
exercised.94 Through his analysis of jurisprudence he finds that “the Court has placed evergreater emphasis on the need for Aboriginal rights to be defined by negotiations between parties,
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tacitly signalling that Aboriginal rights are flexible and future-oriented, rather than mere relics of
the past”.95
I take the position that Aboriginal title is not encased or exhausted by jurisprudence,
however jurisprudence has had a significant structuring effect on how struggles for indigenous
sovereignty are articulated in Canada. It is constitutive of contemporary struggles for selfdetermination. This relationship – between Aboriginal title and self-determination - can be drawn
out by identifying the ways that Aboriginal title continues to represent a form of legal violence
against First Nations. The argument here is not that Aboriginal title should be singularly
understood as a form of colonial violence, rather it is that by paying attention to the ways that
First Nations critique, interrogate, and struggle through and over Aboriginal title we can identify
the subtle and consequential ways that law’s violence remains a tenable and structuring force As
I have been arguing throughout this paper, both property and jurisdiction are key sites of the
expression and regeneration of law’s violence.
As already noted, Aboriginal rights and title are constitutionally protected through
Section 35(1) of the 1982 Constitution Act. The Charter does not elaborate on the scope and
content of Aboriginal title, leaving the issue of how to define Aboriginal title and what its
protections mean up to the courts. Moreover, how Aboriginal rights and title are district from,
however related to, the Crown and state law, has been left to the courts to determine. Thus
jurisprudence on Aboriginal title is a key site of its development in Canada.
The development of Aboriginal title is said to be one of the most significant historical
legal developments in the common-law world that has forced courts to question and limit the
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assumed sovereignty of the Crown over territory.96 The efforts of the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary
chiefs, as well as the Gitxsan Hereditary Chiefs, have contributed significantly to the legal
development of the recognition of Aboriginal title in Canada. The appeal judgement in the
Supreme Court of Canada, Delgamuukw v. Attorney General of British Columbia in 1997, is a
landmark case dealing with Aboriginal title. It represents the first time the courts acknowledged
the existence of Aboriginal title. The case began when 35 Gitxsan and 13 Wet’suwet’en
Hereditary chiefs submitted a claim for Aboriginal title against the Province of British Columbia.
In this case, the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs claimed, individually and on behalf
of their houses, portions of 58,000 square kilometres of BC. The area was divided into 133
individual territories, claimed by 71 houses, to represent the large and diverse First Nations.
Their claims initially focused on ownership of the territory and jurisdiction over it in the trial
court, where they lost. However, on appeal they decided to claim instead Aboriginal title over
land and self-government, notions in line with Canada’s legal framework for the recognition of
First Nations sovereignty. Moreover, on appeal the individual claims were amalgamated into two
communal claims, one on behalf of each nation.
The trial in the Supreme Court lasted 397 days, involved 61 witnesses giving detailed
evidence of genealogy, anthropology, and history. The trial decision was 394 pages long.97
Importantly, the plaintiffs lost the case for technical reasons: the pleadings describing Aboriginal
peoples’ historical political organization were not properly drafted, leading the court to hold that

96

See Paul G McHugh, Aboriginal title: the modern jurisprudence of tribal land rights (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011); See also Louis A Knafla, “‘This Is Our Land’: Aboriginal Title at Customary and Common Law in
Comparative Contexts” in Louis A Knafla & Haijo Jan Westra, eds, Aborig Title Indig Peoples Can Aust N Z Law and
society series (Vancouver, BC) (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 1.
97
See James I Reynolds, Aboriginal peoples and the law: a critical introduction (Vancouver, BC : Purich Books, an
imprint of UBC Press, 2018) at 99-100.

40

this prejudiced the Crown’s defence of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en claim.98 The SCC also
found that in the trial decision Chief Justice McEachern did not give any independent weight to
oral history evidence and preferred evidence of Crown witnesses over the evidence of
Indigenous communities.99 However, while the judgement does not provide a declaration of
Aboriginal title and Rights of the appellants, it does provide a comprehensive account of
Aboriginal title. The SCC ordered a new trial, which has not happened, and therefore the specific
claims of the appellants have not been resolved. In requesting a new trial, however, the courts
laid out what was required to determine the existence of Aboriginal title.
Fast forward to 14 May 2020. After years of resistance to continued natural resource
extractive development on their lands, which exploded into protests and rail blockades across the
country in January and February 2020, the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs, the B.C
Government and the Federal Government sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
recognizing Wet’suwet’en rights and title. The MOU states that Canada and B.C. "recognize that
Wet'suwet'en rights and title are held by Wet'suwet'en houses under their system of governance",
and that the federal and provincial governments "recognize Wet'suwet'en Aboriginal rights and
title throughout the Yintah".100 The MOU affirms a commitment by all parties to negotiate,
within three months beginning at the time of signing (ending mid August 2020), legal
recognition of the authority of the Wet'suwet'en Houses as Indigenous governing bodies holding
Aboriginal rights and title. The MOU indicates that Wet'suwet'en title is a legal interest in land,
and that "[j]urisdiction that flows from Wet'suwet'en Aboriginal rights and title will be
transferred to Wet'suwet'en over time". It further states that in some cases jurisdiction will be
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exclusive to the Wet'suwet'en, and in some it will be shared with Canada or B.C. Over the next
12 months, as agreed in the MOU, the specifics of how Aboriginal and Crown titles interface
will be determined. This is indeed a significant development, but why did it take 23 years after
the landmark Delgamuukw judgement to reach this agreement? What happened in the
intervening years? What role has law, in jurisprudence and practice, had in maintaining
conditions of uncertainty about Aboriginal rights and title in the context of the struggle of the
Wet’suwet’en?
Aboriginal title is a collective claim. This characteristic dates back to the Calder case in
1976, where the courts determined that Aboriginal title exists in Canadian law, based on prior
occupation and possession, whether or not it had been granted. The Calder case was significant
for the fact that it "allows the courts to consider First Nations as political groups with their own
legal systems and the right to seek remedies from the crown for failure to perform its
obligations".101
Property is a central category through which Aboriginal title is rendered. In Delgamuukw
it is noted that Aboriginal title cannot be “described with reference to traditional property law
concepts”.102 Aboriginal title is a unique proprietary interest: “Analogies to other forms of
property ownership – for example, fee simple – may help us to understand aspects of Aboriginal
title. But they cannot dictate precisely what it is or is not”.103 Nonetheless, the ownership rights
conferred by Aboriginal title are similar to those associated with fee simple, including “the right
to decide how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right
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to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the right to proactively use
and manage the land”.104 Importantly, Aboriginal title excludes the right to alienate.
It was not until the SCC judgement in Tsilhqot’in (2014) that Aboriginal title was finally
proven. The court applied the test and guidelines from Delgamuukw. In the trial judgment it was
determined that the Tsilhqot’in Nation, not the Indian Act bands, was the group with an
Aboriginal title claim.105 "The characteristics of Aboriginal title flow from the special
relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal group in question. It is this relationship that
makes Aboriginal title sui generis or unique".106 It was determined that the land was owned by
the Tsilhqot’in, not the province of British Columbia.
In Tsilhqot’in, the courts describe key characteristics of Aboriginal title:
The claimant group bears the onus of establishing Aboriginal title. The task is
to identify how pre-sovereignty rights and interests can properly find
expression in modern common law terms. In asking whether Aboriginal title is
established, the general requirements are: (1) “sufficient occupation” of the
land claimed to establish title at the time of assertion of European sovereignty;
(2) continuity of occupation where present occupation is relied on; and (3)
exclusive historic occupation. In determining what constitutes sufficient
occupation, one looks to the Aboriginal culture and practices, and compares
them in a culturally sensitive way with what was required at common law to
establish title on the basis of occupation. Occupation sufficient to ground
Aboriginal title is not confined to specific sites of settlement but extends to
tracts of land that were regularly used for hunting, fishing or otherwise
exploiting resources and over which the group exercised effective control at
the time of assertion of European sovereignty.107

In this paragraph we can identify a few characteristics that are important for my understanding of
how jurisprudence on Aboriginal title structures forms of legal violence and contributes to the
development of narratives of conflict. First, in the above excerpt from Tsilhqot’in, we can
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identify a distinction between excusive occupation and site-specific rights as grounds for
Indigenous land rights. In regards to the first, Aboriginal title demands exclusive occupation of
the land at the time of crown assertions of sovereignty. Site-specific rights, however, depend on
“practices, customs or traditions integral to the distinctive cultures of Indian and Inuit peoples at
the time of colonization".108 Site-specific rights are based "broadly on practices, customs, and
traditions that could, but need not, have been followed as a result of rights and interests
supported by legal norms arising within Aboriginal societies".109
This framing iterates the ‘distinctive culture’ test developed in the Vanderpeet judgement.
In 1996, the court held that Aboriginal rights only protected those practices, customs, and
traditions that were ‘‘integral to the distinctive culture’’ of particular groups prior to European
contact (Vanderpeet, at para. 5): ‘‘To satisfy the integral to a distinctive culture test the
aboriginal claimant must… demonstrate that the practice, custom or tradition was a central and
significant part of the society’s distinctive culture… that it was one of the things that truly made
the society what it was’’ [Vanderpeet, at paragraph 5, emphasis in original].110 The Vanderpeet
test effectively freezes Aboriginal rights in the past. As John Borrows argues, this decision
deprives Aboriginal peoples “of protection for practices that grew through intercultural
exchange… The rights of Aboriginal peoples should… be based on the continued existence of
Aboriginal communities throughout the continent today”.111 Instead, the courts look to the past to
determine and legitimate the content of Aboriginal title claims.112
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Prior occupation of land also allows for the infusion of colonial property values into
Aboriginal title claims. Aboriginal title is a proprietary interest to the extent that the land is
inscribed in such a way that it becomes ‘property’ in a way legible to the state and law. Brenna
Bhandar explains how property norms relating to inscription and improvement as evidence of
property rights find their way into Aboriginal title jurisprudence. Aboriginal title and rights,
Bhandar explains, “are based on aboriginal peoples’ prior occupation of the land but defined in
relation to Anglo-Canadian norms of private property ownership and colonial sovereign
power”.113 She explains how aboriginal title is made legible in the courts through idioms such as
use and occupation. “Occupation, which grounds the claim of possession, is defined on the basis
of cultivation, enclosure, or regular use of the land claimed”.114
Another characteristic of Aboriginal title is the ‘prove it’ approach. The ’prove it’
approach that is central to the Aboriginal title paradigm demonstrates how the legal category is
oriented toward assuming the right of the Crown over lands and territories. This dates back to
Delgamuukw, where the courts placed the onus of proof on First Nations (who never agreed to
the assumed sovereignty of the crown, nor did they agree that underlying title to their lands
resides it the crown). As Lois Knafla explains, "[t]he proof of Aboriginal title had to be made in
British terms, had to be reconciled with an alien crown sovereignty, and even then was subject to
the economic and social needs of the state".115
The significance of placing the burden of proving Aboriginal title on the Aboriginal
group cannot be understated. Not only does it fail to recognize the obvious point that Aboriginal
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groups did occupy the land before the assertion of European sovereignty,116 but it also demands
an incredible about of work and resources from First Nations. This is identified as a key issue, or
barrier, in the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Call to Action, Item
#52, where significant revisions to Aboriginal title are demanded:
We call upon the Government of Canada, provincial and territorial
governments, and the courts to adopt the following legal principles: (1)
Aboriginal title claims are accepted once the Aboriginal claimant has
established occupation over a particular territory at a particular point in time.
(2) Once Aboriginal title has been established, the burden of proving any
limitation on any rights arising from the existence of that title shifts to the
party asserting such a limitation.

Finally, despite the landmark Tsilhqot’in judgement, it leaves an incredible amount of
uncertainty and ambiguity in relation to Aboriginal title cases, according to Dwight Newman. He
argues that “[t]he contents of Aboriginal title continue to be unclear in ways that wreak ongoing
harm on fledging Indigenous economies. And the uncertainties pose ongoing problems for
negotiated solutions that could further reconciliation in ways that court decisions never can”.117
The recognition of Aboriginal rights and title should open space for the expression of
dynamic and diverse Indigenous laws. By doing the opposite – by looking for exclusive
occupation, relying on a ‘prove it’ approach, and creating further conditions of uncertainty – the
contemporary ‘recognition’ of Aboriginal title contributes to the structuring of a narrative where
Indigenous expressions and assertions of their laws that do not fit within this framework are
understood as outside of the legal ‘recognition’ of Aboriginal rights and title and therefore as in
conflict with the state. In other words, the limiting of Indigenous law that is central to Aboriginal
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title contributes to the production of knowledge about conflict whereby First Nations are
positioned as delinquent, outside; as agitators. This is further emphasized and demonstrated
empirically below. First, I explain the duty to consult.

The Duty to Consult
"The duty to consult is a procedural duty that arises from the honour of the
Crown prior to confirmation of title. Where the Crown has real or constructive
knowledge of the potential or actual existence of Aboriginal title, and
contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it, the Crown is obliged to
consult with the group asserting Aboriginal title and, if appropriate,
accommodate the Aboriginal right. The duty to consult must be discharged
prior to carrying out the action that could adversely affect the right."118
The duty to consult and accommodate in Canada is a constitutional duty that arises from the
recognition of existing Aboriginal title and rights in Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
It provides an opportunity for First Nations to participate in decisions regarding resource
extraction, even in cases where Aboriginal title has not yet been ‘proven’. The duty to consult is
thus a separate area of law from Aboriginal title, however it is related. It derives from the Haida
decision where it was determined that even in cases where Aboriginal rights and title were not
confirmed, that there was a Crown duty to consult indigenous peoples when their lands and
territories were going to be impacted by development. In the Haida Nation decision in 2004, the
court held that the government, in transferring a tree farm licence to the company Weyerhaeuser
on Haida territory, should have consulted the Haida Nation prior to these actions. This is due to
the fact that the “Crown is bound to act honourably in its relation with Aboriginal peoples”.119
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In Haida, the court centred the duty to consult on maintaining the honour of the Crown.
When the Crown has knowledge of the potential impacts of activity on territory where there are
legitimate claims to Aboriginal rights or title the duty is owed by the Crown due to its duties of
honour. The scope of the duty to consult is proportionate to the strength of the claim to
Aboriginal rights or title, and to the potential impacts of the proposed project on the title.120 The
Honour of the Crown is maintained, according to Haida, when engagement is meaningful,
engaged in good faith, and in regards to procedural safeguards and administrative law121; "Sharp
dealing is not permitted. However, there is no duty to agree; rather, the commitment is to a
meaningful process of consultation".122
Haida introduced the idea of a ‘spectrum’ whereby the extent and rigorousness of the
duty to consult is measured against the strength of a claim to Aboriginal rights or title: "At one
end of the spectrum lie cases where the claim to title is weak, the Aboriginal right limited… at
the other end of the spectrum lie cases where a strong prima facie case for the claim is
established, the right and potential infringement is of high significance to the Aboriginal peoples,
and the risk of non-compensable damage is high".123 The judgment also introduced the important
point that the duty to consult is a commitment to a process, not a resolution or agreement.124
Haida was the first in a trilogy of judgments from the SCC in 2004 and 2005 that have
contributed significantly to the development of the duty to consult in contemporary
jurisprudence. These cases mark “a shift from a focus by the court on static constitutional
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rights… to a dynamic proceduralism, a new approach that allows for the opportunity to
recognize asserted Aboriginal rights and interests and protect them form unilateral Crown
action”.125 In a judgement involving the Taku River Tlingit First Nation in 2004, the Supreme
Court concluded that the government met the consultation requirement through an environmental
assessment that considered the possible impacts of a new road on the First Nations land, as well
as a title claim.126 In the Mikisew Cree case (2005), which dealt with the duty of the government
to consult with the First Nation in the development of a new road near/through their reserve on
Treaty 8 lands, the SCC determined that there was a duty to consult in order to ensure that there
was an honourable processes in the taking up of lands for the road.127
Dwight Newman explains that this trilogy of cases has contributed to the emergence of
five fundamental components in the duty to consult:
1) The duty to consult arises prior to proof of an Aboriginal rights or title
claims or in the context of uncertain effects on a treaty right 2) The duty to
consult is triggered relatively easily, based on an insufficient level of
knowledge on the part of the Crown relative to a possible claim with which the
government action potentially interferes 3) The strength or scope of the duty to
consult in particular circumstances lies along a spectrum of possibilities, with
a richer consultation requirement arising from a stronger prima face
aboriginal claim and/or a more serious impact on the underlying Aboriginal
right or treaty right 4) Within this spectrum, a duty ranges from a minimal
notice requirement to a duty to carry out some degree of accommodation of the
Aboriginal interests, but it does not include an Aboriginal power of veto over
any particular decisions 5) Failure to meet a duty to consult can lead to a
range of remedies, from an injunction against a particular government action
altogether (or, in some instance, damages) but, more commonly, an order to
carry out the consultation prior to proceeding.128
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There is significant room for political and social factors in each of these components, creating
forms of friction between Aboriginal peoples and the state. Moreover, the five components
illustrate the degree to which the duty to consult has become more of a process rather than a right
and endgame.

The Duty to Consult and the configuration of Aboriginal Title as a centralized
property regime
The ‘spectrum’ based on the strength of Aboriginal title or rights claims reproduces an idea of a
hierarchy of rights. South African property law scholar Andre Van der Walt explains how the
centralist property paradigm produces a rhetoric and logic of a hierarchy of rights, whereby
“property rights are primarily valued according to their status as either property rights, personal
rights or no-rights, and also as either strong rights, weak rights, or no rights”.129 Within this
paradigm, ownership is a ‘strong right’ that “may have the status and force of trump rights,
which means they will practically always trump other rights because they are stronger than any
other right”.130 Property in Western legal cultural is organized around a logic of centrality, he
argues, which “relies on unreflective intellectual habits” which in turn present a barrier to social
and legal transformation in “that they condemn certain persons to the margins of society and of
law, either by design or by default”.131 It is worth quoting him at length:
Accepting or confirming the centrality of property, even indirectly, tends to
confirm a certain hierarchical ordering between having property, which
centralists consider normal, and not having property, which centralists
consider extraordinary. Assignment of having property to the center and not
having property to the margins of normality justifies the unequal distribution
of property and power in society, not only when the lack of property results
129

Van der Walt, supra note 66 at 27.
Ibid.
131
A J (Andries Johannes) Van der Walt, “Property and Marginality” in Eduardo M Peñalver & Gregory S Alexander,
eds, Prop Community (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 81.
130

50

from the personal shortcomings of the have-nots but also when society accepts
it more sympathetically as the result of some natural or social disaster that
upset the normal course of events… Ownership or property famously acts as a
fence that protects the individual against outside threats" which depends "upon
the presence of property on one side of the conflict as must as on its absence
on the other.132
Property is central to wider conditions of social inequality to the extent that it effects not only the
distribution of material goods, but also informs assumptions about legal marginality: “property is
central to the system in that the presence of property equals and justifies recognition and
protection of social, economic, and legal autonomy and power, whereas absence of property selfevidently translates into and justifies the continued existence of social, economic, and legal
weakness, vulnerability, and dependence”.133
By constructing Aboriginal title along a spectrum, Indigenous peoples, particularly when
their claims to Aboriginal title remain unproven, are assumed to have lesser rights than the state,
and assumed to be in a position of weakness. The point being that it is not necessarily the
absence of Aboriginal title that leads to dispossession, but the legal ability to undermine the
strength of Aboriginal title, leading to a weaker claim, that contributes to the realization of law’s
violence, even in contexts where Indigenous peoples have not been dispossessed. The concept of
slow violence is helpful here. In his landmark book, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of
the Poor, Rob Nixon introduces the concept of slow violence as a strategy and means to
illuminate, and make visible, the ongoing forms of violence that are not captured or represented
by singular events. Whereas forms of spectacular violence – including of course the specific
moment of eviction or dispossession - often garner attention, fill headlines, and invoke visceral
responses, it is the slow moving, ongoing, forms of violence and their effects that Nixon is
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seeking to describe through the work of a broad range of writers, both fiction and non-fiction.
Slow violence, he explains, occurs over time, its effects are the result of ongoing movement, and
outside the purview of most renderings of violence. He explains, “slow violence is often not just
attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term,
proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly
but gradually degraded”.134 Slow violence, he argues, is “pervasive”, has “delayed effects”.135
While Nixon does not write specifically about property, his focus on displacement clearly
has implications for how we understand property dispossessions temporally and spatially:
“Attritional catastrophes that overspill clear boundaries in time and space are marked above all
by displacements – temporal, geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that
simplify violence and underestimate, in advance and in retrospect, the human and environmental
costs”.136 Nixon proposes “a more radical notion of displacement, one that, instead of referring
solely to the movement of people from their places of belonging, refers rather to the loss of the
land and resources beneath them, a loss that leaves communities stranded in a place stripped of
the very characteristics that made it inhabitable”.137 This is a particular description of property
dispossession that parallels the concept and theory of dispossession developed by Robert
Nichols. Nichols (2020) explains a recursive, boot-strapping character of dispossession, whereby
forms of property theft, even if not in themselves leading to dispossession, overlap and
contribute to one another.138 Dispossession is thus formed in a context of structural violence that
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is “subtended by systemic transfer, loss, and group differentiation” and divests “Indigenous
peoples in a distinct and particular way of their ancestral homes" (Nichols 2020, 98).
Dispossession can thus be accomplished through processes of slow violence whereby specific
‘moments’ or effects of law may seem innocuous (such as the ‘spectrum’ of the duty to consult
as it is measured against the ‘strength’ of an Aboriginal title claim) but can lead to the systemic
undermining of Aboriginal peoples sovereignty and self-determination.
The ability to infringe on Aboriginal title further underscores the inherent ‘weakness’ of
the recognition of Aboriginal title. The ability of the Crown to infringe on Aboriginal title is a
further example of law’s violence. The courts have developed a right to infringe on Aboriginal
rights and title. Federal and Provincial governments can infringe on Aboriginal rights and title if
they can satisfy a test to justify infringement, which includes determining if such infringement
would be in the public interest. As Jim Reynolds explains, “[t]his test is another creation of the
judges and is not mentioned in Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, or elsewhere in the
Constitution".139 According to Tsilhqot’in,
to justify an infringement, the Crown must demonstrate that: (1) it complied
with its procedural duty to consult with the right holders and accommodate the
right to an appropriate extent at the stage when infringement was
contemplated; (2) the infringement is backed by a compelling and substantial
legislative objective in the public interest; and (3) the benefit to the public is
proportionate to any adverse effect on the Aboriginal interest. This framework
permits a principled reconciliation of Aboriginal rights with the interests of all
Canadians.140
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The ‘recognition’ of Aboriginal title thus rests on a deeply colonial positioning: despite its
celebratory origins, it has fundamentally become a framework for the infringement of rights and
uses the language of burden rather than partnership in decision-making.141 What the ‘duty’
entails, and when it arises, remains an active area of debate and contestation linked to
determinations of the ‘strength’ of Aboriginal title.
The primary point of struggle in the duty to consult and accommodate, I argue, is the
effort to make it mean something that it is arguably not intended to mean – the right to consent,
and by implication the right to veto if consent is not gained. In other words, Indigenous peoples
do not have a right to veto a project based on the existence of Aboriginal title. Sarah Morales
argues that the doctrine of the ‘duty to consult and accommodate’ (DTCA) in Canada has not
“developed in a manner that recognizes the right to self-determination. Instead, it assumes
Crown sovereignty and attempts to reconcile Indigenous interests to the development interests of
the Canadian state”.142 The courts have not been shy about underscoring this point: “The duty to
consult and accommodate… flows from the Crown's assumption of sovereignty over lands and
resources formerly held by the Aboriginal group”.143 The DTCA does not provide a jurisdictional
right to make decisions over land and territory to the extent that development projects can be
stopped.
In the recent case of Coldwater Indian Band et al. v Attorney General of Canada, these
issues are stated in no uncertain terms: "Where there is genuine disagreement about whether a
project is in the public interest, the law does not require that the interests of Indigenous peoples
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prevail”.144 "The case law is clear that although Indigenous peoples can assert their
uncompromising opposition to a project, they cannot tactically use the consultation process as a
means to try to veto it".145 When adequate consultation has taken place but Indigenous groups
maintain that a project should not proceed, their concerns can be balanced against “competing
societal interests”.146

The Wet’suwet’en
I am going to avoid paraphrasing the Wet’suwet’en’s descriptions of themselves. The paragraphs
below were written by the Office of the Wet’suwet’en and published in a submission to the BC
EAO and Coastal GasLink Pipeline (2014). They describe both the Wet’suwet’en and their title.
The Wet'suwet'en are an Athabaskan culture related to inland Dene groups
and speak a unique dialect, which they share with the Nat'oot'en or Babine
people. The Wet'suwet'en are a matrilineal society organized into a number of
exogamous clans. Within each clan are a number of kin based groups known
as Yikhs, often referred to as House groups. Each House group is an
autonomous collective that has jurisdiction over one or more defined
geographical areas known as the House territory.

Within the context of Wet’suwet’en society, this ownership is considered to be
a responsibility rather than a right. Hereditary Chiefs are entrusted with the
stewardship of territories by virtue of the hereditary name they hold, and they
are the caretakers of these territories for as long as they hold the name. It is
the task of a head Chief to ensure the House territory is managed in a
responsible manner, so that the territory will always produce enough game,
fish, berries and medicines to support the subsistence, trade, and customary
needs of house members. The House is a partnership between the people and
the territory, which forms the primary unit of production supporting the
subsistence, trade, and cultural needs of the Wet’suwet’en.
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… As the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Delgamuukw made clear,
Aboriginal title is based on and informed by the Aboriginal people’s special
attachment or relationship to the land. The Wet’suwet’en's special relationship
to the land, grounds and affirms our title. The Wet’suwet’en express their
special relationship through how we organize ourselves on the land, though
our governance system, our laws, feast, clans, houses, chiefs, our people's
identification with the territory through our crests, Kungax, totem poles, and
Baht’lats. Individually and together these expressions of our special
relationship to the land are integral to our distinctive Wet’suwet’en culture,
and our title includes exclusivity and incorporates present-day needs.
Our Aboriginal title provides us with the right to occupy and use the land
exclusive of all others. It provides us with an exclusive right to decide whether
and how land and resources will be occupied and used according to our
cultural values and principles, exclusive not only of Coastal GasLink and its
investors but also of the BC EAO. It provides us alone – exclusive of Coastal
GasLink and its investors - with right to develop and benefit from the economic
potential of our land and resources. Development and use that is
irreconcilable with the nature of the Wet’suwet’en's special attachment to the
land is precluded. Wet’suwet’en title is inalienable and cannot be transferred,
sold or surrendered to anyone other than the Crown.
The Wet’suwet’en have never relinquished or surrendered Wet’suwet’en title
and rights to the lands and resources within Wet’suwet’en territory and
continue to occupy and use the lands and resources and to exercise, enjoy and
depend on existing title and rights within our territory. We have an inherent
right to govern ourselves and our territory according to our own laws,
customs, and traditions. This was affirmed in the Supreme Court of Canada
Delgamuukw decision.

There are five Wet’suwet’en Clans. The Gilseyhu (Big Frog), Laksilyu (Small Frog), Gitdumden
(Wolf/Bear), Laksamshu (Fireweed), and Tsayu (Beaver clan). Each clan is made up of two or
three house groups, which include people matrilineally connected to the point where everyone in
the same house group knows how they are related. I include this description (above) in part to
underscore the importance of the nation-to-nation relationship between the Wet’suwet’en and the
Crown. Wet’suwet’en declarations of self-determination are therefore constituted in part through
the specific legal characteristics of their relationship with the state. Wet’suwet’en position
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themselves in a nation-to-nation relationship, thus underscoring that the enduring struggle is one
over the jurisdiction of nations. However, as I show in this section, the jurisdictional authority of
the Wet’suwet’en is challenged through a range of different state laws, strategies, and
governance arrangements and processes, as the latter continues to operate as if state jurisdiction
is hegemonic.
Wet’suwet’en have long resisted extractive activities on their land, which they have used
and occupied for thousands of years: "Wet'suwet'en authority on the land base has played an
essential role in maintaining the strength of cultural identity among the Nation. Despite
generations of assimilation efforts, the Wet'suwet'en have attempted to reconcile their authority
with the Crown for 150 years to no avail".147 The full history of their struggle for sovereignty
against the actions and presumptive legitimacy of the Crown is beyond the scope of this project,
however an important landmark in their struggle is the Delgamuukw judgement in the Supreme
Court.

Coastal GasLink Pipeline
The CGL Pipeline begins at an inlet in the Groundbirch area of British Columbia, will run (once
construction is completed) approximately 670 km to deliver natural gas to a liquified natural gas
terminal in Kitimat, BC. The CGL Pipeline is owned by LNG Canada, which is a joint venture of
five global energy companies, Shell (40% interest in the project), North Montney LNG (25%
interest), Diamond (15% interest), PetroChina (15% interest), and Kogas (5% interest). The CGL
pipeline is the largest private sector investment in Canadian history, at $40 billion (NEB 2019).
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As the Office of the Wet’suwet’en describes, “190 km of the proposed Coastal GasLink Project,
from Honeagh Bin in Yextsowiten territory to Uyenii in Lho Kwah, lie within Wet’suwet’en
Territory over which the Wet’suwet’en maintain Aboriginal Title and Rights”.148 Despite a
history of opposition, in 2014 CGL received its Environmental Assessment Certificate, which,
according to TransCanada, was gained after a two-year environmental and technical review, as
well as a 7,200-page application to the B.C. Environmental Assessment Office (BCEAO).
Permits from the B.C. Oil and Gas Commission (BCOGC) followed shortly thereafter, thus
providing CGL the green light to begin construction.149
Despite the victory in Delgamuukw explained above, the Wet’suwet’en have had to
actively resist ongoing attempts to establish extractive industries on their traditional territories. In
2007, the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary chiefs expressed their opposition to all pipelines on their
territory, including the Pacific Trail Pipeline (PTP). As part of the ongoing resistance to
pipelines, a checkpoint was established at Wedzin Kwa entrance in Unist’ot’en, in April 2009,
and cabin construction began soon after directly on the location of proposed pipeline corridors.
In 2012, Ms. Huson, Mr. Naziel and others set up a bridge blockade on the Morice West forest
service road. On 3 September 2015 hereditary chiefs from all five clans, as well as
representatives from the office of the Wet’suwet’en, visited the camp at Wedzin Kwa and
asserted their support for the Unist’ot’en and affirmed their commitment to stop all pipelines
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(Unist’ot’en camp website).150 In addition to these material acts of resistance, the Wet’suwet’en
have also engaged actively in the consultation process and challenged the permitting process.
Throughout their resistance to the CGL pipleline, the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary
Leadership met with TransCanada as part of a process of consultation. In their consultation,
TransCanada met with the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Leadership beginning in 2012. At the time
of publication of the first consultation report in 2013, the WHL had been met with 5 times
however they had not received any capacity funding, while the majority of other First Nations
had.151 However, as reported in 2014, between June 11 2012 and November 15 2013, Trans
Canada reports that they met with the WHL a total of 11 times. Trans Canada reports here that
they provided the Hereditary Leadership capacity funding to help compensate all the work
involved in these consultations.152 They met with the Wet’suwet’en Band Council 16 times,
more than any other Band or First Nation. Of the 17 First Nations consulted throughout this
period, four raised concerns about the potential impacts of the pipeline on the Aboriginal and
Treaty Rights: 1) Nadleh Whut'en First Nation 2) Nak'azdli Band 3) Wet’suwet’en Hereditary
Leadership 4) Saulteau First Nation.

Legal geographies of jurisdiction and property and their constitutive relationship
with conflict
If jurisdiction is the pronouncement of law’s authority and legitimacy, it is also through
decisions about jurisdictional authority that law’s violence is realized. One of the constitutive
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ways that law’s violence is exercised is through methods of erasure that serve to ignore
Indigenous jurisdictions. The following example is indicative of this process.
Provincial jurisdiction has been an area of contention in the CGL pipeline dispute,
leading to a decision from the National Energy Board (NEB) that is illustrative of how
jurisdiction is dealt with and imagined within Canada’s current constitutional framework. On 30
July 2018 Mr. Michael Sawyer submitted an application to the NEB to “determine and issue a
declaratory order that the CGL Pipeline is properly within federal jurisdiction and subject to
regulation by the Board”.153 The application was to seek a declaration on the jurisdictional place
of the project. While the entirety of the CGL pipeline exists within the province of BC, Sawyer
argued that because of the inter-provincial transportation links required to sustain the project that
it should fall within Federal jurisdiction and therefore be subject to Federal environmental
review. The jurisdictional question was firstly a constitutional question referring to sections
91(29) and 92(10)(a) of the Constitution which outlines that works and undertakings, such as
pipelines, “that are located wholly within a province are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
provincial legislature, while those that connect one province with another province, or that
extend beyond the limits of a province, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
parliament”.154
On 26 July 2019 the National Energy Board tabled its decision on a matter concerning
the Jurisdiction of the Coastal GasLink Pipeline Project. The NEB found, against the hopes of
the applicant, that indeed the CGL Pipeline fell within provincial jurisdiction. However, the
decision provides key insights into how this Pipeline is regulated in relation to the jurisdictions
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within which it runs, even if those jurisdictions do not have the ultimate authority to govern it.
One of the most startling aspects of the proceedings is that while the issue at hand was to
determine which jurisdiction the pipeline was within, Indigenous peoples are not even mentioned
as having a voice in the jurisdictional debate. Considering the assertions and active participation
of the First Nations in the Consultation process, these hearings demonstrate the extent to which
they are ultimately excluded from any proceedings that do not, by law, include them.
It is clear that none of the participants in the jurisdictional review thought that the
Aboriginal rights or title interests at stake raised relevant questions of federalism. The Attorney
Generals of BC and Saskatchewan engaged directly with the question of cooperative federalism,
arguing that “constitutional doctrine must facilitate, not undermine, cooperative federalism. The
AG of Saskatchewan noted that cooperation between governments is what, in part, makes the
division of powers in the Constitution work”.155 The submission from the Attorney General of
BC is a fundamentally a statement, or pronouncement, of erasure of Indigenous jurisdiction, or
existence, for that matter. The AG of BC argues that because CGL pipeline will exist entirely
within the borders of the province, “laws should be made at the level of the jurisdiction closest to
the people affected. Intra-provincial transportation primarily affects the people of that province.
Inter-provincial transportation jurisdiction is for those cases where regulatory decisions will have
significant extra-provincial impacts”.156 The centrality of the matter of jurisdiction is further
legitimated through appealing to a spatialized ‘local’. In the conclusion to the final report on the
matter, it is stated: “the Project is a local work and undertaking properly regulated by the

155

Ibid at 44.
Argument of the Province of British Columbia (2019) National Energy Board Hearing Order MH-052-2018.
Jurisdiction over the Coastal GasLink Pipeline. Available at: https://apps.cerrec.gc.ca/REGDOCS/Item/View/3767869. At 4.
156

61

province of BC”.157 This is a particular rendering of the ‘local’ that ignores the competing claims
to space and territory made by Indigenous peoples.
As we know from the critical literature on jurisdiction, these matters are not mundane
matters of law and government but rather a pronouncement and practice of state-law’s
legitimacy. The province and the courts treat jurisdiction as a technical legal issue; as an
apolitical decision about how to delegate authority between different ‘levels’ of government over
different kinds of environmental decision-making. In the decision of the NEB we identify how
jurisdiction in the macro sense of a state asserting and re-asserting its sovereignty is performed
through the micro-details of determining whether or not a project is ‘local’ or of Federal interest.
By working as if Aboriginal title is not an issue of jurisdiction that needs to be folded into this
decision-making, Indigenous sovereignty is left to be imagined as nothing more than a rights
interest, rather than a question of Federalism.
Indigenous sovereignty claims are often rendered as concerns over cultural rights, a
transition that Glen Coulthard has identified in the Dene Nation in the Northwest Territories. He
identifies a shift whereby political rights to self-determination are translated as, and undermined
through, a politics of recognition focused on the recognition and protection of Aboriginal cultural
interests. He argues that the genocidal and assimilationist policies and ideologies of the colonial
period have been modified through contemporary politics of recognition so far as to be
“reproduced through a seemingly more conciliatory set of discourses and institutional practices
that emphasize our recognition and accommodation. Regardless of this modification, however,
the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state has remained colonial to its
foundation".158 In this context Indigenous peoples can secure rights to particular cultural
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activities practiced on land, but not to jurisdiction over lands.159 The interpretation of Aboriginal
peoples claims to jurisdiction as matters of culture is illustrate through the work of the EAO.
Throughout these consultations, the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Leadership expressed their
deep concern with the impacts of the project. Despite the celebrated Delgamuukw judgement, the
validity of strength of the assertions of Aboriginal Title by the Office of the Wet’suwet’en and
the hereditary chiefs are routinely undermined by state agencies. An exchange between the
Office of the Wet’suwet’en and the BC Environmental Assessment Office is a telling example.
In its submission to the EAO, the OW directs the EAO to review the testimonies and judgement
provided in Delgamuukw as clear evidence of the legitimacy of the Wet’suwet’en claim to
Aboriginal title, however in its reporting it is very unclear (and therefore unlikely) that the EAO
referred to the Delgamuukw decision at all in its determination of Aboriginal title. Moreover, in
conclusion to review of the Aboriginal title and rights interests and how they will be impacted
by the Coastal GasLink project, OW explains:
“The Wet’suwet’en, who have constitutionally protected rights, have
determined that the proposed Coastal GasLink project will have further
significant environmental effects and cumulative impacts that include: loss and
deterioration on lands and resources, unlawful infringement of our rights, and
deterioration of our health and community well-being… It is the Wet’suwet’en
position that both the Coastal GasLink Project and the BC EAO process pose
serious and irreversible infringements to Wet’suwet’en title and rights. In
accordance with Wet’suwet’en law and authority, the thirteen Wet'suwet'en
Hereditary Chiefs assert our Wet'suwet'en title to our entire territory,
including the area through which the proposed pipeline would pass”. 160
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In response, however, the EAO reports: “EAO is of the view that the proposed Project would
have low to moderate impacts on Wet’suwet’en asserted Aboriginal title to the Project area”.161
This conclusion from the EAO is rationalized by splicing up and segregating specific
issues that are otherwise understood as constitutive parts of a broader indigenous legal order
articulated by the Wet’suwet’en. They refer to cultural rights, rather than matters of jurisdiction.
For example, rather than acknowledging the cumulative impacts of the Coastal GasLink pipeline,
as described by the Wet’suwet’en, EAO reports separate impacts on hunting, gathering, fishing,
trails and travel ways.162 It is a direct attempt to deny the inter-connected nature of indigenous
legal orders and consider that an impact on one of these categories would have impacts on all
others. It is a strategy to render jurisdictional claims as issues of disconnected and heterogeneous
cultural rights.
The practices of the EAO represent attempts to challenge and undermine the
jurisdictional authority of the hereditary leadership. These acts can be understood as methods of
erasure expressed through the language of jurisdiction. These methods need to be understood as
a rendering of jurisdictional territory in a language amenable and legible to settler law. Rather
than acknowledging the inter-related nature and character of Indigenous laws, as described by
the Wet’suwet’en, the EAO very simply averts to an understanding of jurisdiction that is
cohesive, homogeneous, authoritative. The ease at which the EAO moves from the rich and
detailed descriptions of the relationship between Indigenous law and the land to a purportedly apolitical statement of state law is telling of the pervasive power of settler law as a unquestioned
‘fall back’ position.
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This is an example of law’s role in underestimating the impacts of extractive activities, a
characteristic of law’s slow violence. Professor Dayna Scott describes the particular ways that
law is interwoven into slow violence. She explains Nixon’s approach:
law’s slow violence is in the provision of complex principles, institutions, and
mechanisms by which we judge as rational the systematic underestimation and
discounting of human and environmental costs that can be displaced over time
or space. Thus, law’s violence must be appreciated and made visible in its dayto-day rigging of the contests over land, bodies, labour, and resources that
Nixon describes. Law provides the structures through which the displacements
are done.163
The jurisdictional erasures explained above provide the mechanisms through which law
underestimates and undermines Indigenous legal orders, contributing to conditions of slow
violence that perpetually challenge Indigenous sovereignty. It is in these conditions that the
Wet’suwet’en are mobilizing and asserting their rights to self-determination.
It would be inaccurate to suggest that the jurisdictional and territorial space being created
through consultation processes is an exclusively state space. According to Haida, third parties
like resource companies and proponents do not have a duty to consult and accommodate. But in
practice, it is indeed these parties that are carrying out the consultation, that are determining the
format, determining the place to meet, and having a significant influence on determining the
scope and nature of the duty to consult. Thus, these are spaces where state jurisdictional
authority is being enacted via corporate actors who have a significant stake in the project.
The duty to consult is being fulfilled through the work of corporate actors who are in turn
seeking to define the scope of Aboriginal rights. The Yellowhead Institute reports that according
to the Impact Benefit Agreement, Coastal GasLink seeks out “irrevocable consent” for the
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project and stipulates that the First Nation quell any current or future dissent to the project from
within the Nation. As reprinted by the Yellowhead Institute, the IBA reads: “[The First Nation]
will take all reasonable actions to persuade [First Nation] members to not take, any action, legal
or otherwise, including any media or social media campaign, that may impeded, hinder, frustrate,
delay, stop or interfere with the Project’s contractors, any Authorizations or any Approval
Processes”.164 This is an example of how jurisdictional authority is performed by a range of state
and non-state actors. Through their work they create territory through the legal and governance
processes of consultation. These processes – and their practices – function to exclude First
Nations methods of decision-making and governance. An effect is that First Nations assertions of
Indigenous law and governance is rendered as outside of and in conflict with the other actors
engaged in these efforts.

Injunctions: Protecting ‘property’ within a settler legal geography
Within the legal geographies of resource extraction, injunctions have become the ‘new normal’
for corporate actors trying to limit the impacts of Indigenous resistance to their extractive
projects.165 Irina Ceric defines what an injunction is:
An injunction is a court order issued by a judge after an application is filed by
a party to a lawsuit and is meant to protect the interests or rights of that
applicant while the case is pending… If the injunction application is
successful, the court issues an order forbidding the feared actions. An
injunction can be interim (temporary) or interlocutory, meaning that it will
stay in effect until trial.166
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The question of what it is in law is of course only part of the issue – I am particularly concerned
about what injunctions do in the context of state and First Nations relationships. Ceric argues that
injunctions are part of settler-colonial legality that maintains the jurisdiction of the Canadian
state over Indigenous territories, and a means by which Indigenous land defenders are
criminalized (via contempt of court charges).167 While I agree that injunctions contribute to the
creation of legal spaces where material police-enforced violence is legitimated against
Indigenous land protectors, the kind of legal violence that injunctions serve to enforce is much
wider than processes of criminalization.
In Canada, injunctions have historically been used as a means of indigenous
dispossession for the purpose of development and extractive activities on their lands. For
example, a recent report by the Yellowhead Institute which was based on an analysis of more
than 100 cases of injunctions found that only 18.5 % of injunctions filed by First Nations to stop
industry and government activity across Canada were successful, while 76% of injunctions filed
by corporations against First Nations were granted (Yellowhead 2019). The skewed outcomes
demonstrate the courts unwillingness to recognize Aboriginal rights and title and accept
indigenous jurisdiction.
Ceric explains the role of injunctions in criminalization. If someone violates the terms of
an injunction, they can be charged for being in contempt of court. The use of contempt of court
charges, argues Ceric, is a “specific, and especially pernicious, form of criminalization”.168
Injunctions provide a means to literally send land defenders to prison. Contempt of court charges
are not part of the Criminal Code, so the accused do not benefit from Criminal Code protections
nor are they subject to a trial by jury. There is an issue with this rendering of the criminalization
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of indigenous protest in conditions of settler colonialism, in that leads to a narrowing on the
specific court proceedings involving individuals charged for their acts of resistance. This
involves an unacknowledged scalar jump from the broader conditions to the legal charges against
individuals.
My argument here is that injunctions reinforce a centralized and hierarchical conception
of property rights and contribute to the production of knowledge about resource conflict in
important ways. The criminalization of Indigenous land defenders is one aspect of this, but to
focus on criminalization in this context focuses too narrowly on charges against individual
peoples, and not on the formation of knowledge about conflict – and the constitutive
understanding of Aboriginal rights as lesser rights against the state. A condition that perpetually
positions First Nations as agitators of conflict rather than the subject of egregious violations of
their rights and sovereignty.
Injunction proceedings are part of the micropolitics of jurisdiction and through them we
can identify how the courts are used to powerfully articulate provincial jurisdiction. They
demonstrate how jurisdiction is at once a multi-scalar process, whereby the specifics of legal
argument are used to affirm a wider structural condition of the attempted erasure of Indigenous
sovereignty. This is underscored by the point that injunctions cannot be challenged by claims to
Indigenous sovereignty. As Irina Ceric explains the role of the “collateral attack” doctrine in
injunction proceedings; it “precludes any challenge to the basis for the injunction itself. This rule
rests on the notion that a court order is to be obeyed until it is set aside, varied, or reversed on
appeal and that the validity of an injunction cannot be attacked in any other proceeding”.169 This
fundamentally excludes any challenges to injunctions based on claims to Indigenous sovereignty.
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However, the Unist’ot’en camp did make such an argument in the injunction proceedings,
asserting that they are acting in respect of Wet’suwet’en law on unceded Wet’suwet’en lands.
On 3 November 2018 an application for injunction was served to the Unist’ot’en camp,
and by 15 December 2018 a judge ruled that the gate blocking CGL access must come down. On
the 7 January 2019 an RCMP tactical unit descended on the Gidumt’en checkpoint, arresting 14
land defenders and supporters and dismantling the gate. Armed with assault rifles and watched
overhead by helicopters, the full force of the state and its commitment to protecting corporate
interests was on display. Pictures and videos from the arrests were shared widely on social media
and in the following days protests in support of Unist’ot’en filled streets across the country. The
hereditary chiefs announced in the following days that they would comply with the temporary
injunction, to the surprise of many. One commentator thought this was in part a response to the
RCMP and the state finally taking notice of the authority of the hereditary leadership (APTN
news). By the 7 of February, a statement on reconciliation between the province and the office of
the Wet’suwet’en was agreed to by both parties (OW and BC 2019).
A decision on the interim injunction was handed down by BC Supreme Court Justice
Marguerite Church on 31 December 2019. Church granted an injunction against members of the
Wet’suwet’en nation, giving them 72 hours to take down their camp at the Morice West Forest
Service road and the Gidimt’en Access Point, blocking workers from the CGL worksite. The
decision is indicative of the settler rationalities being articulated in this ongoing contestation. The
injunction judgement is based on a centralized property paradigm, a rationality that informs both
the courts as well as narratives of the ‘conflict’ in popular media.
The analysis provided in the judgment is based on identifying people who are outside of a
centralized property paradigm. A centralist property paradigm privileges and naturalizes vertical
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and hierarchical sets of relationships. For example, it posits owners against non-owners and rests
on the hierarchical nature of rights along an axis that moves from no rights, to some rights, to
more rights. He explains the ordering function of centralist thinking:
centrality means that property is the key to the system of property rights (and,
by extension, to a large part of the system of rights as a whole)— having
ownership (or other rights) in property triggers a whole series of legal
entitlements and privileges, just as its absence implies exclusion from those
entitlements and privileges. Thus, property is central to the system in that the
presence of property equals and justifies recognition and protection of social,
economic, and legal autonomy and power, whereas absence of property selfevidently translates into and justifies the continued existence of social,
economic, and legal weakness, vulnerability, and dependence.170

Therefore, those with no rights are assumed to have to demonstrate that they have property
rights, a logic central to the ‘prove it’ approach to Aboriginal title claims. The burden of proving
Aboriginal title is on Indigenous peoples, who must go through the courts or negotiate with the
Crown to demonstrate that they have an Aboriginal rights and title interest over a particular
territory. As Eugene Kung and Gavin Smith – both staff lawyers at West Coast Environmental
Law – explain, this is a ‘prove it’ approach that is characteristic of Canadian law on Aboriginal
title. Despite the recognition of Aboriginal rights and title, they explain,
in practice the legal reality of Aboriginal title and governance has been
largely held back from on-the-ground application by the Crown’s fallback
position, which could be cynically summarized as “Yes, Aboriginal title and
governance exist, but we don’t know where exactly and it’s quite complicated,
so in the meantime we’re going to continue making decisions as if it doesn’t
exist anywhere.171
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The ‘prove it’ approach informs Judge Church’s judgement. Judge Church looks for the ability
of the protesters to demonstrate that they have a legitimate property right. Rather than assuming
that they have the right, and assuming that it was then the state’s responsibility to demonstrate
that they do not have rights, she holdss that the protestors do not have a consistent or legitimate
claim to property rights. Rather than interpreting the different protests and protest camps that
have emerged as part of a resistance to the CGL pipeline, Church understands the protests as
groups making questionable claims to hereditary authority, and uses her interpretation of the
apparent heterogeneity of claims to be indicative of a lack of cohesion and therefore a lack of
credible claim to Aboriginal title. It is this logic that perpetuates an interpretation of ‘local’
conflicts.
In the Federal Court judgement upholding the interlocutory injunction, handed down 31
December 2019, Judge Church explains:
The evidence before me indicates significant conflict amongst members of the
Wet'suwet'en nation regarding construction of the Pipeline Project, including
disagreements amongst the Wet'suwet'en people as to whether traditional
hereditary governance protocols have or have not been followed, whether
hereditary governance is appropriate for decision making that impacts the
entire Wet'suwet'en nation and the emergence of other groups, such as the
Unist'ot'en, which purports to be entitled to enforce Wet'suwet'en law on the
authority of Chief Knedebeas and more recently the WMC, which apparently
seeks to challenge the authority of the hereditary chiefs to make decisions for
the Wet'suwet'en nation as a whole and the manner in which the traditional
governance processes have occurred.172

She further writes:
the elected Band councils assert that the reluctance of the Office of the
Wet'suwet'en to enter into project agreements, out of concern that it might
negatively impact their claims to aboriginal title, placed the responsibility on
the Band councils to negotiate agreements to ensure that the Wet'suwet'en
172

Coastal GasLink Pipeline Ltd v Huson, 2019 Supreme Court of British Columbia at 134.

71

people as a whole would receive benefits from Pipeline Project and other
projects in their territory. This appears to have resulted in considerable
tension between the Office of the Wet'suwet'en and the elected Band councils,
which is readily apparent in the some of affidavit materials filed by members
of the Wet'suwet'en community.173
The following four paragraphs from Church’s decision are indicative of how her reasoning, and
her interpretation of ‘internal conflicts’ is used to undermine and challenge assertions of
Indigenous law.
[137] All of this evidence suggests that the indigenous legal perspective in this
case is complex and diverse and that the Wet’suwet’en people are deeply
divided with respect to either opposition to or support for the Pipeline
Project.174
[149] The aboriginal title claims of the Wet’suwet’en remain outstanding and
have not been resolved either by litigation or negotiation, despite the urging of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw.175
[151] Thus rather than efforts to prevent violation of Wet’suwet’en law, the
defendants’ efforts appear to have been directed specifically towards
opposition to pipelines in general and the Pipeline Project specifically. Their
public statements do not reference traditional Wet’suwet’en governance
structures and upholding the authority of Chief Knedebeas, but rather describe
the Unist’ot’en Camp as their focal point, part of a territorial “reoccupation”
and strategically located in the Pipeline Project right of way as part of a
resistance effort. They continue to encourage the establishment of new
blockades and participation of individuals from outside the local community to
join the blockades and establishing new structures in locations designed to
impede the Pipeline Project or its construction.176
(165) Instead, the defendants chose to resort to self-help remedies. As I have
already noted there no evidence before me of any indigenous law which
authorizes blockades of roads or bridges as a mechanism to deal with breach
of Wet’suwet’en law177
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Church expects that the First Nations resisting the CGL pipeline must position themselves as a
cohesive, collective subjectivity rather than a dynamic political group negotiating and asserting
Indigenous law in their own ways.
Judge Church’s decision assumes the cohesiveness of Aboriginal nations resisting the
pipeline; it perpetuates an individualizing narrative that has long been corrosive in depictions of
Indigenous peoples’ struggles. For example, in media representations and published
documentation of the resistance of the Wet’suwet’en, these First Nations are consistently
referred to as a ‘community’ or ‘group’ rather than a People. Trans Canada, for example,
consistently uses the terms ‘Aboriginal groups’, ‘Aboriginal communities’, ‘Aboriginal
interests’, ‘Aboriginal people’.178 This “negatively singular” and “individualizing” terminology
has a long history in government discussion.179 Moreover, Coastal GasLink advertises that it
values the relationships it has built with First Nations along the pipeline route and that its
approach to engaging with Indigenous groups and other stakeholders is based on "building
relationships, mutual respect and trust while recognizing the unique values, needs and interests
of each community”.180 This is not an issue of semantics. In Section 35 of the Constitution Act
refers to Aboriginal peoples as ‘Peoples’, a collective sovereign group. The International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights two international covenants both protect the right to self determination of
Peoples. The UNDRIP similarly refers to Indigenous peoples as part of collective societies. The
near absence of a recognition of the Wet’suwet’en as peoples, and the consistent trend to refer to
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them as a ‘community’ is much less a slip and a misunderstanding and more of a symptom of
settler colonialism and the denial of Aboriginal Peoples’ jurisdiction over land.
The injunction has become a site of Indigenous resistance and assertions of autonomy
and self-determination in terms of jurisdiction.181 In response to the judgment, for example, the
Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs released a media statement on January 4, 2020 stating
Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs representing all five clans of the Wet’suwet’en
Nation have issued an eviction notice to the Coastal GasLink (CGL) pipeline
company. The eviction of CGL is effective immediately, and applies to “Camp
9A” on Dark House territory, as well as the neighbouring Gidimt’en, Tsayu,
and Laksamshu clan territories. Hereditary chiefs have gathered on Gidimt’en
and Gilseyhu territories to monitor the eviction.182
Thus, the injunction has become a site where the Wet’suwet’en assert their sovereignty in terms
of jurisdiction.

Creating a ‘conflict’ and producing slow violence
In popular news and in government statements, a narrative of an ‘internal’ struggle between the
elected band officials and the hereditary chiefs has emerged. This narrative derives in part from
centralist property thinking that is represented in Judge Church’s decision. The narrative of an
internal conflict has been perpetuated by the premier of the province of British Columbia, who
said at a press conference that, in contrast to the elected Band councils, the Wet’suwet’en
hereditary chiefs have recently “emerged”, by implication questioning their legitimacy as
representatives of their people.183 This is a startling opinion from the Premier. As OW explains,
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the WHL have been present as representatives in negotiations with the crown for over 150 years,
and in addition they have actively participated in the consultation process with CGL from the
beginning, thus the suggestion that they have recently emerged in the specific context of the
struggle against Coastal GasLink is an active form of denial, erasure, and the perpetuation of
state violence. Peter Grant, legal council for the Wet’suwet’en nation, remarks in an interview
with Aboriginal Peoples News, that “the band councils do not have jurisdiction in Wet-suwet’en
territory over the traditional territory. Everyone knows that within the Wet’suwet’en nations,
whether they are band councillors or hereditary chiefs. That's not a matter of dispute".184 Grant
further explains that the BC Government has not properly consulted with the hereditary chiefs in
a way that they demonstrate that they are willing to modify their plans through consultations.
Downplaying the historical significance of Wet’suwet’en jurisdiction, as realized in part
through their indigenous legal orders, and suggesting that hereditary leadership is ‘re-emerging’,
are all constitutive ways that the idea of an ‘internal conflict’ is created to undermine the
legitimacy of the struggle. It is also an outcome of the specific legal practices and ideologies that
underpin state claims to jurisdiction and property, as I have been explaining throughout. It is
through these specific struggles that we can identify expressions of (state) law’s contemporary
violence, and their effect on the production of knowledge about conflict. The law produces
conflicts, all the while remaining the assumed benchmark against which all indigenous laws are
measured. Conflict is assumed to arise due to disharmony in First nations/indigenous
communities, rather than as an outcome of the imposition of state laws.
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The Memorandum of Understanding
Earlier in the chapter I explained that on 14 May 2020 the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs came
to an agreement with the B.C. and Federal Government and signed an memorandum of
understanding (MOU) affirming the recognition of Wet’suwet’en Aboriginal rights and title and
setting a strict timeline for the negotiation of jurisdictional arrangements between the
Wet’suwet’en and the Crown. On his Instagram page, Hereditary Chief Smogelgem writes that
the signing of the MOU “is the first step towards self-determination and returning to the
mindsets of our pre-contact ancestors” and “Colonialism is dying in Wet’suwet’en Yintah”.
The MOU appears to be widely criticized by elected band members in the Wet’suwet’en
nation who had previously agreed to the CGL pipeline. Reports indicate that the elected band
members were not included in the direct negotiations between the Hereditary Chiefs, Canada,
and B.C. Days before the signing of the MOU, 4 of 6 elected chiefs in northern B.C. rejected the
MOU, demanding to be included in its negotiation. As reported by APTN news, Dan George,
chief of the Ts’ilh Kaz Koh First Nation, said “They are proceeding without us, and we are a
major part of this hereditary system, and as elected chiefs, we have signed agreements with
environmental projects”.185 He continues,
This is the not the hereditary chiefs land, this is the community’s land… They
are not following the responsibilities of Hereditary Chiefs. To ignore their clan
members and Elected Councils, something is terribly amiss. They do not
represent us, and they have no legal authority to negotiate or sign any
documents on behalf of our clans or our members without a mandate… Rights
and title are the collective rights of ALL Wet’suwet’en people; they are not
held only by Hereditary Chiefs and they cannot be defined or compromised by
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the small hand-picked group the government is dealing with. That is 19th
century treaty making, not 21st century reconciliation.186

In an apparent response to concerns among elected Chiefs about the negotiations leading to the
MOU and directly following it, the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs released a press statement
on 1 June 2020. In it they describe the effects of colonization on their governance systems:
Since time immemorial, our Clans, Tsayu, Gitdumten, Laksilyu, Laksamshu
and Gilseyhu and our house members have come together to plan, to make
decisions across our yintah and take care of each other. This indigenous way
of decision making is based upon our Kungax, our oral history and Anuk
niwh’it‘ën, our sacred laws and is often witnessed in our bahalts, potlatch.
We have almost two centuries of colonial forces attempting to assimilate and
dismantle our Wet’suwet’en governance system, our language and ceremonies
and our connection to the yintah. With much respect to our grandparents,
parents and ancestors, they kept our ways of being alive for us today and for
those yet to come… Collectively we are working together to continue on this
path, to listen, to reach out and to rebuild the relationships the oppressive
forces have left behind.187
The fact that the MOU ignited further discussions among First Nations impacted by the CGL
pipeline is indicative of the governance issues at stake in the project. The statement above,
however, is an example of how these particular negotiations provide an opportunity to engage
deeply with Indigenous governance issues. These negotiations are constitutive of assertions of
self-determination in the contemporary moment.

An alternative legal geography and an alternative understanding of conflict
It is in this legal context that Indigenous peoples are asserting their self-determination by
defining their own elements of consent. The Yellowhead Institute, for example, summarizes
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some of the characteristics of Indigenous consent by defining four distinct elements of
Indigenous consent – Restorative, Epistemic, Reciprocal, Legitimate. They explain: “While these
constitute an evolving and generalized form of consent (many nations often have their own
models and principles), we see this conceptualization emerging from Indigenous-led consentbased practices that de-centre state authority and obligations, revitalize Indigenous knowledge,
law and custom, and promote inclusion within and even across communities”.188 It is on this
point that I turn to the struggle for self-determination by the Wet’suwet’en peoples.
In contrast to defining the ‘local’ in relation to Constitutional doctrine, Indigenous
peoples assert their authority to the territory through which CGL will pass through appeals to
transnational law and norms on Indigenous peoples’ rights. Transnational indigenous rights
norms have long had an important role in interpreting the rights at stake. The Unist’ot’en
established a Free Prior and Informed Consent protocol, which is “is a request of permission to
enter the lands of the traditional chiefs and matriarchs. Visitors are asked to identify themselves
and their relationship to the hosts, as our ancestors did. Like a border crossing, the protocol
questions make Unist'ot'en land a safe place. FPIC ensures peace and security on the
territory”.189 Professor Margot Young from UBC’s Allard School of Law, explains that
International law is central to the resolution of the disagreements on Wet’suwet’en territory: “All
levels of government are bound by treaties signed by Canada, and Canadian constitutional law is
to be informed by these human rights obligations. United Nations concerns are not to be lightly
cast aside”.190
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International standards can be used to pressure the Canadian government to change its
approach. Shin Imai explains that the Canadian approach to consultation, and the courts’
obsession with limiting the question of consent to consultation between indigenous peoples, the
state and industry, is not in line with international standards on the consent standards. He shows
that international financial regulatory bodies commit to the consent standard, for example (Imai
2017). As an indication that the Canadian state is feeling pressure to meet a higher standard of
consent, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada Minister Carolyn Bennett “committed to full
implementation of UNDRIP, including FPIC, but insisted on further qualification stating that
FPIC must be interpreted through domestic legal and constitutional frameworks”.191 The
Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs have also engaged with the United Nations on multiple times to
demand recognition of their sovereignty. Hereditary chief Na'moks and Freda Huson made
statements to the special rapporteur during the meeting of the UN Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues in New York in April 2019. In January 2020, Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs
submitted a request to the United Nations to monitor RCMP, CGL, and government, days before
the RCMP dismantled their blockade.
Transnational norms on Indigenous rights have been an important leverage for the
Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chieftaincy particularly because Provincial and Federal Governments
have taken so long to respect their authority. Writing about some of the dynamics of Indigenous
rights struggles in Mexico, political scientist Courtney Young finds fascinating parallels to the
transnational and trans-local struggle in Wet’suwet’en: "When the practices of self-government
create minorities within communities, those minorities are able to reach beyond the community,
to courts, international tribunals, corporate headquarters, and the streets of the capital city to
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voice their opposition".192 She explains the relevance of transnational organizing in conditions of
Constitutional pluralism: “indigenous voices depended on a wide range of venues, strategies, and
mechanisms to achieve their goals; but no venue, strategy, or mechanism, either alone or in
combination, guaranteed a particular outcome, not least because indigenous people often take up
competing positions. Enabling migration among political venues may be the best way of securing
the contingency that anchors the legitimacy of constitutional democracy".193 Thus Aboriginal
title still provides some opportunity to demanding the right to consent, rather than merely
consultation. The transnational character of Indigenous struggles for self-determination is further
illustrated in the next chapter, on the ongoing struggle in Xolobeni.

Conclusion: Reflections on Self-Determination, Jurisdiction, Property and Legal
Violence in Canada
Reading the struggle in Unist’ot’en as one between rival jurisdictions illustrates the particular
practices that contribute to the making, and challenging, of sovereignty between the Canadian
state and the Wet’suwet’en. It demonstrates the ways that Wet’suwet’en jurisdictional claims are
rendered as either proprietary interests or as issues of cultural rights. It also illustrates how the
Wet’suwet’en mobilize and assert themselves in relation not only to the Canadian state, but also
in relation to transnational movements for the rights of Indigenous peoples. Finally, by reading
the Wet’suwet’en reports of post-colonial violence we might identify contemporary politics of
self-determination. In this framework we can identify how conflict is territorialized in relation to

192

Courtney Jung, “The Politics of Horizontal Inequality: Indigenous Opposition to Wind Energy Development in
Mexico” in Andrew Arato, Jean L Cohen & Astrid von Busekist, eds, Forms Plur Democr Const (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2018) at 332.
193
Ibid at 333.

80

settler claims to jurisdiction, producing narratives of ‘inter-communal conflict’ that serve to
undermine Indigenous sovereignty and collective autonomy.
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Chapter 3: Self-determination as resistance to legal violence on an ecological
frontier in Xolobeni, South Africa
In November 2018, the peoples of Xolobeni in the Eastern Cape of South Africa, celebrated a
landmark victory recognizing their right to ‘say no’ to proposed titanium mining on their
territory. They have been struggling against proposed mining for well over two decades and this
court victory sent shockwaves across the country. For some, it was celebrated for recognizing the
legitimacy of customary law and collective decision-making autonomy in relation to mining and
infrastructure development. For others, the judgement signaled an undermining of state authority
to make decisions regarding development that was purported to be in the interest of ‘all South
Africans’. The victory is often articulated as one for Indigenous rights.
Indigenous rights are contested in the South African context. After giving a presentation
on the politics of Indigeneity and legal pluralism in South Africa at the University of Western
Cape, a participant in the room (who had many years of experience in public policy in the
context of land and property issues) said to me “you are barking up the wrong tree by engaging
with Indigenous rights. You know the United States doesn’t only have 52 states, it has thousands
of sovereign states in First Nations?’. He was clearly insinuating that the recognition of
Indigenous rights would lead to the fragmentation of the country, ethnic division, and
ungovernable ‘sovereign states’, a perspective articulated elsewhere.194
The reasoning behind this statement is precisely what makes Indigenous rights
particularly contested in South Africa. The post-apartheid transition has been facilitated through
a Constitutional democracy and the state, as a non-racial and inclusive representation of the
diversity of the country, is imagined as the progressive vehicle to overcome a history of racial
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division. The State, led by the governing African National Congress (ANC), was and is the
liberation party. Moreover, self-determination was used during the anti-apartheid struggle as a
way to assert the rights of all black South Africans against the apartheid state.195 To argue today
that there are indigenous peoples who have rights to self-determination is both to assume that
self-determination for the black majority is not complete through the state, to challenge the state
as a vehicle for liberation, and to risk division in the celebrated ‘rainbow nation’. In other words,
the specific historical context of colonialism, apartheid, and liberation via democracy contributes
to a deep reluctance towards Indigenous rights. Indigenous rights are thus understood to be a
fracture in the wider project of democracy and peoples advocating for their recognition are
blamed for inciting ethnic or inter-communal conflict.
In the broader International and region context, however, Indigenous rights are gaining
currency. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights recognizes three categories of
rights: civil and political, social and economic, and peoples’ rights. The African Charter is
unique for its protection of peoples’ rights. Peoples’ rights refer to the collective rights and
include the rights to self-determination (art. 20), the right to sovereignty over natural resources
(art. 21), right to development (art. 22). People’s rights have been linked to indigenous rights in
Kenya and could potentially be used as a means to recognize Indigenous rights and the
legitimacy of customary law in South Africa as well.196 Across the continent, a number of
landmark judgements concerning Indigenous Peoples demonstrate “that the legal category of
‘indigenous peoples’ has allowed communities (sometimes divided by colonization) to reassert
their rights, using the concept of ‘indigeneity’ as a means of defining themselves as peoples
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entitled to specific rights”.197 I draw inspiration from James Anaya, former UN special
Rapporteur on the right of Indigenous Peoples, who explains that the question of whether or not
one group identifies as indigenous is “secondary to the more focused inquiry about what
concerns the group may be raising in human rights terms and whether it helps to address those
concerns by reference to the indigenous rubric”.198 Indigenous rights contribute significantly to
the development of human rights norms related to customary law and land rights for rural
peoples.
The idea that Indigenous rights are identity-based and divisive is a very powerful
narrative that informs critics across the political spectrum in South Africa and Canada. This is a
conflict narrative that positions one collective actor, a self-identified and self-determined
political actor, against the state. The state is always positioned outside of this narrative. As I did
in the last chapter, here I read assertions of autonomy and self-determination through a
perspective of law’s violence.
Due to this history of colonization, apartheid, and racial division, reading the struggle in
Xolobeni as one over rival jurisdictions orients the narrative in such a way that the rights of the
community, as a collective (referred to as a ‘customary community’), are elevated in relation to
the state. However, this case study also illustrates the complex relationships that have emerged
between human rights and jurisdiction. In a post-apartheid context where citizenship rights are
often translated and articulated through the language of human rights, in Xolobeni, assertions of
jurisdictional authority and self-determination are claims to citizenship rights. As I show, what
appears as a paradoxical relationship (as compared to the struggle in Unist’ot’en) between self-
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determination and citizenship has emerged through particular rural struggles for land rights as
well as conditions of human insecurity and violence experienced by mining effected
communities. These conditions might be understood through the optic of the ‘frontier’.

Legal violence on the frontier
Law’s violence is articulated within a frontier ecology in Xolobeni. A frontier ecology refers to
overlapping and contested discourses of law and governance within a particular imagined and
territorialized space. Anthropologist Anna Tsing describes the imaginative work of the frontier:
“The frontier… is not a natural or indigenous category. It is a travelling theory, a blatantly
foreign form requiring translation".199 A frontier, according to Tsing, is an “an imaginative
project capable of moulding both places and processes”.200 In Xolobeni, peoples’ histories of
threatened dispossession and struggle to protect the land are re-articulated today in the context of
overlapping discourses and proposed development interventions. It is a biodiversity hotspot (one
of around 35 in the world), a ‘development corridor’ according to the state’s recent spatial
development plan, a place of development possibility for a ‘smart city’, a world-class highway
with one of the continent’s largest suspension bridges, and of course, the site of a mine.201
Frontier ecologies are not distinct zones where the colonizer meets the colonized (as Nicholas
Blomley202 characterizes it, for example), or where progress meets wilderness, rather frontier
ecologies refer to “frontiers of ecological change where prior governance arrangements are being
challenged and dissolved to make way for new governance arrangements”.203 Peluso and Lund
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describe ‘frontiers of land control’: “They are sites where authorities, sovereignties, and
hegemonies of the recent past have been or are currently being challenged by new enclosures,
territorializations, and property regimes. What is new is not only land grabbing or ownership but
also… new actors and subjects, and new legal and practical instruments for possessing,
expropriating, or challenging previous land controls ".204 Legal violence, I show, takes particular
forms in frontier ecologies as legal pluralism is particularly accentuated and actors diverse.
Often, it seems, law’s violence in this context has the same result as it always has – it is a tool of
colonial dispossession used to transform land into property and clear territory for resource
extraction. The violence that threatens the peoples of Xolobeni is articulated in no uncertain
terms, as described below. Yet the violence of law is dispersed through a range of actors with
overlapping objectives.
Foundational literature in sociolegal studies explains that law is a deeply contradictory
site of struggle whereby the colonized or dispossessed both experience the violence of law and
appeal to it to leverage rights.205 This is particularly the case in the frontier ecology of Xolobeni,
where histories of resistance to apartheid era dispossession, conservation discourses, a proposed
mine, and a highway in development, overlap in ways that bring jurisdictions and actors into
specific kinds of relations. Law is both a medium for transformation as well as a means to
legitimate the reproduction of histories of racism. In this chapter I illustrate law’s fragmented
and often contradictory role in the struggle for the right to consultation and consent in South
Africa. I demonstrate that significant victories have been won in efforts to gain recognition and
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legitimacy for customary law in South Africa’s new constitution. These victories should not be
understated. However, I identify that despite these victories, law’s role in perpetuating a
constitutive relationship between methods of erasure and processes of divide and agitate, offers
continued opportunities for those opposed to the recognition of customary law to undermine its
validity. Law’s violence, I argue, can be identified through efforts to divide and disrupt local
collectivities, as well as state presumptions of jurisdictional authority. In the previous chapter
developments in Aboriginal title and the duty to consult were interrogated as particular (and
contested) legal vehicles through which self-determination is being articulated against law’s
violence, in this chapter I explain the emergence of the Right to Say No. The Right to Say No
demands that peoples identify themselves as a collective and autonomous group, and positions
them against the power of the state. In the second half of the chapter I explain, first, how legal
violence is legitimated through maintaining abstract, generalized territorializations of space and
condemning ‘local’ conflicts. Local conflicts are constructed in contrast to a presumed broader
territory of governance. Second, I explain how legal violence is legitimated through the use of
technologies of jurisdiction. It is precisely through resistance to both of these forms of legal
violence that we can identify contemporary articulations of self-determination in this contested
environment.
The Right to Say No is a very recent development in South Africa. Calls for adequate
community consultation in the extractive industry have amplified in recent years, as evidenced in
a number of recent reports.206 It has also become the focus of strategic litigation. The ‘right to
consent’, however, is founded on a much different Constitutional commitment than in Canada.
Section 25 of the Final Constitution guarantees that all peoples who lack security of title due to

206

SAHRC (2018) National Hearing on the Underlying Socio-economic Challenges of Mining-affected Communities
in South Africa. Available at: https://www.sahrc.org.za/.

87

racially discriminatory rule are provided with security of land tenure or comparable redress.
Incredibly, in the recent Maledu (elaborated below) Constitutional Court judgement it was
determined that, in part, denying customary land rights as a legitimate source of land tenure
security would amount to continuing a long history of undermining the land rights of racialized
rural peoples and therefore their ‘informal rights’ to land need to be protected on par with
common law property rights. In High Court judgement Baleni this argument was extended to
determine that the people of Xolobeni have a right to determine how decisions are made about
their land, and have the right to say no to development on their lands that they disagree with.207
In others words, in the absence of a Constitutional protection of Aboriginal title, the South
African Courts have used human rights norms, paired with a commitment to provide redress to
histories of racial discrimination, to secure the customary land tenure as a focus of rights in this
rural community.

Struggle over traditional leadership
A key characteristic of the struggle in Amadiba is a conflict between the state-recognized
traditional leadership and the community. The disagreements over the authority of Chief Lunga
Baleni reveal ongoing contestations over jurisdiction and the right to self-determination. Under
the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, the governing body of the
Umgungundlovu community is the Amadiba Traditional Council, and Chief Lunga Baleni is the
chairperson of the Amadiba Traditional Council and the iNkosi (traditional leader) of the
Umgungundlovu Traditional Community. According to ‘official’ records, Duduzile Baleni, while
the acting iNkosana (headwoman) of the Umgungundlovu Traditional Community, reports to
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Chief Lunga Baleni, and therefore cannot act on the Community’s behalf. Chief Lunga Baleni
has agreed to the mine, while Duduzile Baleni argues that he does not have the authority to do
this without first gaining the consent of the impacted community.
In a press statement one of the community leaders, Nonhle Mbuthuma, spokesperson for
the Amadiba Crisis Committee (ACC), states that “[t]he government categorizes the
Umgungundlovu community as part of the Amadiba tribal authority or Traditional Council under
chief Lunga, but the Umgungundlovu community rejects the leadership of chief Lunga insofar as
chief Lunga supports the establishment of the titanium mine on the community land of the
Umgungundlovu people”.208 In an act of defiance against the authority of Lunga,209 Mbuthuma
and members of the ACC argue that they reserve the right to choose their leader. Mbuthuma
further argues that “the community defines itself as such [Umgungundlovu] and members share
the same social values, similar economic interests and aspirations. We are governed by our own
customary law”.210 Here, the reference to their ‘own customary law’ refers to a belief that the
mechanisms for electing traditional leaders are not determined by state legislation but are to be
the product of community negotiation and decision-making.

History and emergence of the right to consent in South Africa
Communities across the African continent have begun demanding the Right to Say No.211
Emboldened by the Pretoria High Court judgment in Xolobeni, discussed below, and tired of the
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devastating impacts of extractive industries on their lands, rural peoples are beginning to
mobilize around what they understand to be a fundamental right. The Right to Say No is not in
legal doctrine or UN Declarations; rather it represents a statement from rural peoples who draw
from the transnational legal standard free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)212 and weave it in
with their own localized demands for the right to veto large-scale industrial projects. It is an
assertion of communities taking back power.
Demands for the right to ‘consent’ have been a central nerve in the land reform struggle
since the transition to democracy in South Africa. Consent is a stronger claim than the right to
consultation, but the latter leads to the former in important ways. Processes of consultation are
central to the processes of transformative constitutionalism,213 as well as to the rights of rural
peoples in democratic South Africa. Transformative constitutionalism overlaps with a theory of a
democratic developmental state, for example, that emphasizes participation, collaboration and
empowerment of all players in society as “central means and ends in our transformative
Constitution".214 Jurisprudence on social rights serves to “enhance the participatory capabilities
of those living in poverty and… facilitate the inclusion of marginalised voices in the debate on
what is required to achieve such a society".215 The new Constitutional order promotes “a way of
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looking at the world that creates a space in which dialogue and contestation are truly possible, in
which new ways of being are constantly explored and created, accepted and rejected and in
which change is unpredictable but the idea of change is constant".216
In the period immediately following the first democratic elections in 1994, legal
advocates and communities understood that ‘consent’ needed to be central to land reform
legislation focused on the communal areas in South Africa. For example, in the draft Land
Rights Bill of 1999, section 13(1) includes the stipulation that “no person who holds a protected
right to land may be deprived of that right without their consent”217. It further suggests that no
prospecting or mining can take place on land without the Minister of Minerals consulting with
and gaining the consent of the owners of the land (Section 48(2(b(i))). The issue of consent is
however conspicuously removed in later drafts, leading critics to ask:
Why did the drafters scrap the provisions in previous drafts that required
community consultation, community consent for transfers, choice about land
administration structures and human rights standards in land rights
administration?... Consultation, consent and human rights protections were
not left out by an oversight. They used to be there. They were taken out.218

The assumption in this statement is that particular actors advocated successfully to take out
requirements of consent and consultation; it is suspected that those lobbying for the increased
power and authority of traditional leaders over lands in the former communal areas were behind
the shift. Around the same time, the White Paper on Traditional Leadership was introduced. The
White Paper was a pivotal moment, according to lawyer Wilmien Wicomb, in that it represents
the first official assertion that traditional leaders must act as custodians of customary law, rather
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than being subjects of, and held accountable by, customary law. In other words, customary law,
rather than being law in its own right, was framed as an accessory to Traditional Leadership.219
This framing is apparent in the presumed role of traditional leaders in being the ‘gatekeepers’ of
consultations:
The system of Bantu authorities eroded the culture of consultation and,
instead, traditional leaders relied more on the power of their backers than on
the collective wisdom of the communities they were leading. It is against this
historical background that steps which are intended to restore the integrity of
the institution of traditional leadership are being taken.220

Note that rather than coming to the conclusion that steps are being taken to restore the integrity
of customary law and the collective forms of governance that it represents, the statement
underscores traditional leadership as the institution to be restored. The post-apartheid rise of
traditional leadership “was facilitated precisely by the statutory empowerment of these leaders
and the further marginalisation of customary law, including the mechanisms of accountability it
requires".221 This has enormous implications for the right to consent, or the Right to Say No, in
that it removes this right from rural communities and legitimates, in statutory law, traditional
leaders as custodians of customary law and the authorities to make decisions above the right and
will of communities.
In transcripts from public consultations and public submissions regrading key postapartheid legislation concerning rural land governance we can identify the recurrent assertion of
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the right to be consulted on matters impacting rural land rights.222 A sense of injustice for not
being properly consulted is a key theme in the history of land tenure reform legislation. It is also
clear that consultation is primarily understood as a collective, or communal, process. For
example, ‘community consultation’ is a term used much more often than general references to
‘custom’ or ‘culture’. This is likely due to the fact that ‘customary law’ is a particular rendering
of a collective and historical practice, which includes a commitment to collective decisionmaking. Thus consultation, as a collective decision-making practice, is used as a descriptive term
more often than an abstract reference to ‘customary law’.
While there is evidence of a history of demands for consultation in the wider context of
transformative constitutionalism, it was not until more recently that both consultation, and the
right to consent, have been litigated in courts. Establishing a Right to Say No is a means of
asserting a form of self-determination and requires drawing from a broad repertoire of rights,
which include international Indigenous peoples’ rights, the realization of legal pluralism, cultural
rights, and the intrinsic value of land and traditional governance practices. As I illustrate below,
the articulation of a right to say no was in part made possible by the landmark Richtersveld
constitutional court judgment and the introduction of living customary law.

The jurisprudence and politics of living customary law
In 2003, the Constitutional Court of South Africa handed down a landmark land restitution
judgment transferring land to the Richtersveld community, marking the first time that common
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law Aboriginal title was applied in an African court.223 The Richtersveld decision was significant
because of how it was informed by law from other jurisdictions; it also marked the beginning of
further South African engagements with transnational policy and international human rights
norms in land reform. The Constitutional Court argued that the community had rights to land and
that these rights were properly determined by reference to ‘Indigenous law’.224 Importantly,
‘Indigenous law’ meant the same thing as ‘customary law’ in the judgment, a change in language
that arguably served to naturalize and solidify a link between ‘customary law’, which has a long
history in South Africa and ‘Indigenous law’ with its international human rights connotations.
Taking inspiration from common law principles defining Aboriginal title, the
Constitutional Court determined that the subject land was owned communally, that the
community had been historically defined in part by its exclusion of others, that it had exclusive
rights to the subject land, and that its rights included prospecting, mining, and using minerals.225
After the Supreme Court of Appeal found that customary ownership was ‘akin to common law
ownership’,226 the Constitutional Court went further by finding that the right to land in question
amounted to what it termed ‘Indigenous law ownership’ in its own right.227 The court explained
the concept of ‘Indigenous law’ by referring to its evolving nature, “. . . Indigenous law is not a

223

A. K. Barume, Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa, 2nd Edition, (Copenhagen, International Working
Group on Indigenous Peoples in Africa, 2014); K. Lehmann, ‘To define or not to define: The definitional debate
revisited’, American Indian Law Review 31, 2 (2007), pp. 509-529; H. Mostert, “Beyond ‘Richtersveld’: the judicial
take on restitution of communal land rights in South Africa’, In L. Godden and M. Tehan (eds) Comparative
Perspectives on Communal Lands and Individual Ownership: Sustainable Futures (Routledge, New York, 2010). pp.
215-240.
224
Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC), Para 50.
225
Through the testimonies of expert witnesses, the SCA found that “This evidence clearly establishes that the
Richtersveld community believed that the right to minerals belonged to them and that they acted in a manner
consistent with such a belief. They exploited the minerals without requesting permission from anyone to do so
and, significantly, strangers respected their rights by obtaining their permission to prospect for minerals and
concluding mining and mineral leases with them” (SCA 2003, 87).
226
Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2003 (6) BCLR 583 (SCA), para 29 and 111.
227
Alexkor v Richtersveld, (2003), para. 51.

94

fixed body of formally classified and easily ascertainable rules. By its very nature, it evolves as
the people who live by its norms change their patterns of life”.228 The Constitutional Court
argued that legal pluralism needed to be taken seriously in South Africa.229 It is from these
statements of the evolutionary and changing character of customary law, as well as its place in
South African law, that the concept of ‘living customary law’ was born.
The Richtersveld judgment advances Indigenous Peoples’ customary law rights beyond
the framework developing in common law jurisdictions elsewhere. Jérémie Gilbert explains that
the recognition of possession and customary law as a source of land rights in the case goes
beyond its recognition in common law countries such as Australia and Canada where Aboriginal
title is subordinated to the power of the state to extinguish it.230 Instead, the court “adopted a less
State-centric approach to Indigenous peoples' land rights, emphasizing the power of customary
laws”.231
Aboriginal title and Indigenous rights represent human rights norms that develop in both
political contexts and international arenas. They have been interpreted and elaborated in
transnational spheres of deliberation and translated into local contexts as they are rendered in
‘the vernacular’.232 James Anaya explains that the expansive use of Aboriginal title should be
understood in relationship to the emerging articulation of Indigenous rights, a “process in
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connection with norms and values”233 evolving within a larger political field of Indigenous
identification and organization. From this perspective we can acknowledge that the assertion of
Indigenous subject positions and Indigenous rights involve processes of articulation in which
norms, values, and histories of dispossession are shared and compared, such that legal forms
emerging from one colonial history can be used to address others.234
The significance of the Richtersveld decision is illustrated by the fact that it is cited
repeatedly in key judgments on the development of living customary law and its application in
the communal areas of the former bantustans (reserves) in South Africa.235 Living customary
law has been an important means by which communities can define their autonomy against the
powers of traditional leaders. In the judgement Royal Bafokeng (RBK) Nation (2018) the
applicants asserted their autonomy over land they had owned collective (as a property under
common-law) and argued therefore that they did not have to submit to the authority of the whole
nation. Importantly, they appealed to the duty to consult.236 Judge Gutta decided that “A failure
to recognize the duty to consult as legally enforceable, fosters arbitrariness and autocracy, and
undermines the participatory democracy which is at the heart of our Constitution and of RBN
governance”.237 The victory represented by this judgment is understood by researchers and legal
critics to be another victory for living customary law.
In the Constitutional Court judgment, Maledu v. Itereleng Bakgatla Minerals Resources
Limited (2018) (Maledu), concerns a collectivity self-identified as the Lesetlheng community. In
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the judgement the court dealt with the question of informal land rights as protected by the
Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA). The determining issue was whether
"the applicants are without a legal remedy simply by virtue of the fact that they constitute a
community whose tenure of the farm in issue here is legally insecure as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices".238 IPILRA stipulates “no person may be deprived of any
informal right to land without his or her consent” (IPILRA, Section 2). The judgment deals
precisely with determining the specific history of dispossession experienced by the applicants
and the governance relationship between rural communities and the traditional territory within
which they reside.
In the Maledu judgment Petse AJ, writing for an unanimous court, determined that the
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) had to be read in conformity with
the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA) .239 He ruled in response to the
spirit of the Constitution, asserting the legislation at stake (IPILRA and MPRDA) needs to be
interpreted in line with the Constitutional commitment to dealing with histories of racialized
deprivation.240 The court determined that “the MPRDA must be read, insofar as possible, in
consonance with IPILRA… There is no conflict between these two statutes; each statute must be
read in a manner that permits each to serve their underlying purpose".241 Most significantly, the
judgment protects the right to consent to mining, rather than merely consultation.
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In November 2018 the Umgungundlovu community of Xolobeni won a landmark
judgment in the Pretoria High court affirming their right to say no to resource extraction without
their consent, which they could only grant according to their own customary governance
structures. This is now known as the Xolobeni judgment against mining on their territory. During
the court proceedings on 23 April 2018, Advocate Tembeka Ngcukaitobi (acting for the
applicants) declared that “there is no question that the applicants are an Indigenous people” to
justify drawing upon international Indigenous Peoples’ rights and more specifically, the right to
exercise FPIC.242 The fact that the people of Xolobeni were never dispossessed of their land
during apartheid, have a long historical and cultural connection with their land, as well as a
history of continued marginalization by the state, appeared to be significant to their Indigenous
subjectivity being unchallenged. The applicants also drew inspiration from a long history of rural
resistance in the area.
In the Xolobeni judgment, Judge Basson found that the applicants have the right to be
consulted, under the MPRDA, and to consent to development on their land, as required by
IPILRA. The judgment is a profound assertion of the links between the cultural practices, ways
of life, heritage significance, and land as territory in Umgungundlovu. The judgment emphasizes
the relationships between individuals, households (umzi), the wider community, and the land
they collectively use and manage. Importantly, and in a further reflection of the influence of the
Constitutional commitments to transitional justice, Judge Basson highlights that contemporary
vulnerability of informal land rights is due to the historical marginalization of customary law and
the common law ‘interpretations’ of such laws. The decision of the court aligns with an argument
made by land rights lawyer Wilmein Wicomb: rights arising from customary law are unique, or
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exceptional, in that “these rights suffered from historical discrimination. They therefore deserve
special protection and promotion”.243 The applicants “may not be deprived of their land without
their consent” and the community must be allowed to make a decision “in terms of their own
custom” before any proposed deprivation of land takes place.244 The role of international law,
including FPIC, in interpreting the rights of the applicants is affirmed in the High Court
Judgment.245 By recognizing the link between customary law and collective decision-making, the
judgment is also a statement on the authority of autonomous groups against the state.
The judgements above mark important victories for the rights of collectivities to land and
natural resources in South Africa. The Xolobeni judgement easily contributes to this important
jurisprudence. However, this victory needs to be understood in the context of the contested
jurisdictions in which the Xolobeni struggle continues, and the specific significance of a recent
judgement allowing a highway development across their territory.

‘Local’ conflict in conditions of multi-territoriality: Historical struggle,
conservation, the mine, and the highway
Historical struggle
The struggle against mining in Xolobeni is within two wider territorial designations. Xolobeni is
an area within the broad Umgungundlovu community, which exists in the Amadiba territory.
There is a long history of struggle in the area. The Umgungundlovu peoples resisted apartheid
authorities in the Mpondo Revolts in 1960s, rising up against apartheid-era attempts to govern
rural land and institute ‘betterment planning’ through unaccountable chiefs. The Mpondo Revolts
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are remembered as one of the few successful rural acts of resistance against the apartheid state
and its project of racial classification and dispossession. Historical accounts of these revolts
describe the importance of rural forms of governance not accounted for by the apartheid
legislation such as the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act. Historians Sarah Bruchhausen and Camalita
Naiker explain that during open resistance in 1959-1961, ‘tens of thousands of rural dwellers and
migrant workers gathered on mountains, in forests, and in villages to organize a campaign of
resistance in which they rejected the institution of Tribal Authorities as well as the idea of
chieftaincy entirely’.246 They continue, ‘[a] defining feature of the Mpondo revolts was the use of
mountains as sites of subaltern politics and spaces for the organisation of resistance by ordinary
male rural dwellers and migrant workers’.247 Geographers Thembela Kepe and Lungisile
Ntsebeza assert that the ‘Mpondo revolts by far represented the strongest statement by rural
people against social, economic, and political forces that came together to deny them of their
right to democracy and equality’.248 This celebrated history provides a well of memory and
motivation for today’s activists.

Conservation
The transnational importance of the struggle in Xolobeni is underscored by the fact that the area
has long been a focus of conservationists and is a recognized global biodiversity hotspot.
Historically, discourses of conservation and underdevelopment have positioned rural Mpondo
peoples as in need of development introduced, designed and controlled by others. The pairing of
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conservation and underdevelopment has a long history in South Africa, where, even after the end
of apartheid, there remains an entrenched racialized ideology among state officials and
conservation activists that poor black people are a hinderance and threat to biological
diversity.249 In recent years, however, as the effects of climate change have become both more
widely known and more deeply and physically experienced, the conservation of Pondoland has
become an important focus of national and transnational allies siding with the community in their
efforts to stop mining.250

The Mine
The Amadiba peoples have been resisting mining on their land for decades. Despite their victory
in November 2018, the judgement is being appealed and it is expected that the matter will
eventually reach the Constitutional Court. As part of their efforts to stop mining they established
the Amadiba Crisis Committee in 2007, the same year that a mining license was granted to
Transworld Energy and Mineral Resources (TEM), a subsidiary of the Australian owned Mineral
Commodities Ltd. (MRC). A company set up under a black economic empowerment scheme called
the Xolobeni Empowerment Company (XolCo) is a partner in the investment. The license covers an
area of land 22 km long and 1.5 km wide along the Eastern Cape coastline, constituting 2867
hectares. The intention of TEM is open-cast mining on roughly 900 hectares of land within the
mining area. The impacted area, however, will be much larger. Stockpiles, dumps, treatment plants,
pipelines, powerlines, access roads, accommodations of mine workers, and other infrastructure will
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certainly by much wider than the proposed site.251 Research conducted by the ACC and partners
determines that 70 to 75 households, made up of roughly 600 individuals, will be forcibly
dispossessed, while many more will be impacted by the mining activities.252

As explained above, the peoples of Xolobeni won their right to say no to the proposed
mine. However, the DMR is appealing the judgment. The department’s director-general, Thabo
Mokoena, lamented the Baleni judgment in parliament soon after the decision, arguing that if
consent of communities were required, there would be no mining in the country.253 It is not only
state actors who argue that the judgement goes too far and fundamentally undermines the ability
of the state to make decisions regarding mineral resources. Many commentators argue that the
judgement overstates the rights and power of communities against the state, and undermines the
role of the state as the custodian of minerals in South Africa, as stipulated in the MPRDA.
Writing in the Mail & Guardian newspaper, Sabelo Ngubeni argues that the judgement interferes
with the state’s role as the custodian of all minerals in the country and undermines the state’s
ability to grant mining rights. Ngubeni argues “that the consent requirement casts the net too
wide and that it is characterized by many challenges that render its implementation difficult, if
not impossible”.254 The author advocates for a different approach: “The consent requirement may
be dispensed with in favour of free, prior and informed consultation”.255
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The Highway
While I have written about the specifics of the mine elsewhere, in this thesis I emphasize and
elaborate on the proposed N2 WildCoast Highway. Despite the ACC feeling that the mine and
the highway constitute the same threat, the mine has received much more attention by
researchers and journalists. As I show, the dynamics and conflicts arising around the
development of the highway are very similar to those associated with the mine.
The N2 Wild Coast Road (N2WCR) is celebrated as a key piece of a national
infrastructure project part of a National Development Plan. In 2017 the Transport Minister, Joe
Maswanganyi, announced that the road was one of 18 Strategic Integrated Projects approved by
cabinet. The National Treasury is providing most of the capital for the road, however tolls will
also be used to raise money to pay for the construction of the road.
The N2WCR begins at the Gonubie Interchange (near the city of East London in the
Eastern Cape) and ends at the N2 Isipingo Interchange, just south of Durban, a major port city in
the province of Kwa-Zulu Natal. Upgrades to existing roads cover 470 km of the total project.
The remaining 90km runs through what is referred to as the ‘greenfields’ section in the Wild
Coast, the majority of which is within the Umgungundlovu traditional territory. It is this section
that has been contested in court by members of the Umgungundlovu community. Due to the
highway upgrades and the shorter length between East London and Durban (the highway will be
approximately 85 km shorter than the current N2 highway), the highway development will
reduce travel between the cities by an estimated 3 hrs.
The highway will include nine new bridges, all in the greenfields section of the
development. Of these nine proposed bridges, SANRAL is proposing the construction of two of
the largest and most spectacular bridges on the continent, called the Mtentu River Bridge and the
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Msikaba River Bridge. The Mtentu River Bridge will be 1130m long, with a 260m main span
raised 160m high. It will be a balanced cantilever design. The Msikaba River Bridge will be a
580m long bridge held 192m above the river. It will be a cable-stayed design. The development
is certainly impressive for its engineering and vision.
A community member in Mtentu, Sibusiso Mqadi, chairperson of the Amadiba crisis
committee, said the people did not want the road anywhere near their communities because it
would facilitate the Xolobeni mining project. He explains:
We see that the construction of the bridge is going ahead in Mtentu but we are
not part of the process and have been sidelined and even chased away from
meetings to discuss matters pertaining to its construction. The purpose of this
road is to make it possible for trucks to ship the raw materials from Xolobeni
mine to a smelter in East London. So the N2 Wild Coast Toll Road will make it
easier for them to transport the minerals they will get from the mine. The
freeway they are proposing is meant only to reduce the travelling distance to
the smelter in East London, thereby facilitating mining. We are opposed to the
road, just as we are to the mining in Xolobeni. We know the projects are
related.” in City Press.256

Despite the feeling among some members of the community that the highway and the mine
present concurrent and interrelated threats to their land and livelihoods, SANRAL views the
projects in line with how state legislation identifies them – as completely distinct. In a
community meeting at the Konkhulu in Xolobeni in 2017, the CEO of SANRAL explained that
SANRAL is a roads agency and has absolutely nothing to do with the proposed mine. He
explained the organization of government and the distribution of authority; creating an image of
an apolitical process carrying out duties to fulfill national agendas. In an official statement,
SANRAL claims “The N2WCR has no direct link to the proposed Xolobeni sand dune
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project”.257 A perspective that was entirely unconvincing in the political context of Xolobeni. In
a 28 January 2019 statement, SANRAL said the Baleni judgement recognizing the Xolobeni
community’s right to consent “will not have any influence” on the construction of the N2 Wild
Coast Highway.
SANRAL was granted an environmental authorization to implement the project on 19
April 2010 by the Deputy Director General of the Environmental Quality and Protection of the
DEA. The Wild Coast Communities appealed the decision in terms of section 35 of the ECA,
however all the appeals were dismissed by the Minister on 26 July 2011.258 In 2012 members of
the Amadiba coastal villages filed a case in the North Gauteng High Court seeking a judicial
review to set aside the environmental authorization of the N2 Wild Coast Toll Road. By 2017
SANRAL still had not replied to the submitted court papers.
Despite the pending court challenges, SANRAL started to build through the Greenfields
section in 2017. The contract to build the brides was advertised internationally and eventually
given to Aveng Strabag, a joint venture comprising Aveng Grinaker-LTA, based in
Johannesburg, and Vienna based Strabag International. Sometime in the second half of 2017
Sanral began blasting in Mtentu to begin carving out the rock for the highway.259 This
construction sparked protests by local communities. Villagers in the Khanyayo area blocked all
SANRAL construction work on the N2 near Mtentu river in 2017 for more than three weeks.
They were demanding that SANRAL pay compensation for loss of grazing land or the removal
of ancestral graves.260
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Construction on the Mtentu mega bridge was started in January 2018. However, in
October 2018 the Jama community began protests against SANRAL, effectively stopping
construction on the Mtentu bridge. Protesters from the Jama community demanded that
SANRAL provide jobs for local people and fire a project liaison officer who lost the trust of the
community, Mr Zeka Mnyamana. Mnyamana is the former executive of the Xolobeni
empowerment company, formed as a Black Economic Empowerment company in partnership
with Australian Minerals Commodities in the Xolobeni mineral sands mining project. Reporter
Dennis Webster writes in the New Frame that the resistance erupted due to broken promises
made to the community. He writes, “[w]hile the contractors [Aveng-Strabag] initially committed
to spending at least 30% of the project funds on subcontractors from local small, medium and
micro enterprises, the figure was later deemed “not feasible to achieve” and revised down to
7%”.261 The community also felt that the construction site was over militarized and wanted the
security guards to leave. In February 2019, after months of not being able to work due to the
protests, Aveng Strabag terminated its contract to build the bridge and left the job site. They
cited inability to work due to "threats of violence and levels of community unrest and protest
action related to demands made against Sanral".
Unlike the ACC, the Jama community is in favour of the highway construction and hopes
that it will bring jobs to the area. Nonetheless, the ACC stood in solidarity with the Jama
community, writing on 30 October 2018 on their facebook page: “we are in solidarity with the
Jama community protests against Sanral”. In their statement of support for the Jama community,
the ACC writes “Our experience is that Sanral botch social engagement and makes deals with
contractors that doesn't want to hire locals. Local traditional leaders are bribed and communities
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are then divided”. Here we can identify the strategy to divide and agitate, discussed earlier, in the
context of the highway development.
The conflicts that have arisen around the highway development are due in part to broken
promises of industry, and the contractors in particular. The contractors were expected to fulfill a
Constitutional mandate by providing opportunities for local and impacted communities. Their
original commitment to offer 30% of project funds to small, medium, and micro enterprises, the
corporate partners were able to decide to significantly scale back that commitment to 7%,
leading to a loss of trust between the community and the contractors, and a sense of (back
stabbing). Moreover, SANRAL has long touted job creation as a key benefit of road
construction. Sanral spokesperson Vusi Mona is recorded by reporter Lubabalo Ngcukana that
R400m will be allocated specifically for hiring unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled workers,
making it appeal to the demographics of rural Eastern Cape residents who are statistically the
poorest in the country. Further, she says, “R1.5bn is destined for local small, medium and micro
enterprises that include local contractors, suppliers and goods and services to the road and bridge
construction projects”.262 Yet these promises have not materialized, leading to the community
protests.263
The 2012 submissions were eventually heard in the Pretoria High Court December 3-5,
2018. The communities asked the court to set aside the environmental authorization to build the
road. At issue in the attempt to set aside the environmental assessment include first, the socioeconomic impact of tolling were not considered in the authorization, second, there was
inadequate public consultation before approving the road, and third, the alternative routes were
not adequately considered. The submission also explained that the applicants don’t want
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construction to stop, they just want to road to be moved further away from their homes and from
the coast. The applicants argued that the threatened ‘customary community’ needed to be
consulted at the Komkhulu (meeting place) in terms of their customary law, and referred to
transnational norms on community consultation drawn from the World Bank, FPIC, and
UNDRIP.264
In the judgement,265 handed down in March 2019, the Judge C Pretorius sided with
SANRAL, finding that the community consultation that contributed to the environmental
authorization went ‘above and beyond’ industry standards. She denied any real impact on
customary law, refuted the idea that community consultations needed to happen at the Konkhulu
(as, she argues, this was never brought up in the past), and argues that the applicants exaggerate
the potential impacts of the highway. The struggle against the N2 Wild Coast Highway
underscores the persistence of law’s violence against the collective authority of the peoples of
Umgungundlovu. It represents that despite the victory in the Baleni judgement, the wider
structural conditions in which customary law is marginalized are maintained and re-created in a
separate legal case, one where the claims of the community to customary law and autonomy are
rejected and their autonomy disregarded.

Legal violence in Xolobeni
In his context, I identify the persistent expressions of legal violence against the collective
autonomy of the peoples of Umgungundlovu. The descriptions of violence documented below

264

Applicants Heads of Arguments, para 180-186. The applicants also referred to binding treaties such as the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights.
265
Zukulu et al V The Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs et al.

108

illustrate how the conflicts are structural. The violence can be understood as structural because it
is consistently targeted at the self-identified peoples of Umgungundlovu. It is used to subvert the
idea that those advocating against the mine are a self-identified group, a self-determined and
autonomous collectivity. The reporting of the violence consistently avoids describing their
autonomy as a people and the acts of violence are portrayed as disparate, abstract events targeted
at individuals – those who oppose the mine. The conflict is narrated in such a way that the
peoples of Xolobeni are identified not as a self-determined collectivity with their own customary
law, but rather as a group plagued by ‘internal’ conflict. It is through condemning the violence
that the peoples of Xolobeni assert their identities and legitimacy as an autonomous group,
defined by their customary decision-making structures.
In March 2015 the chairperson of the Amadiba Crisis Committee was murdered outside
of his home by two men posing to be police officers. It is widely known that he was murdered
for his active resistance to the mine. There are yet to be any arrests in the relation to the murder.
In December 2015 there were a number of attacks on ‘anti-mining’ community members in the
Xolobeni area, including a threatening attack on the headwoman of Umgungundlovu, Cynthia
Baleni. Upon seeing a group of men coming towards her homestead, Baleni and her family
members hid in a nearby forest when the men searched the area and fired gun shots into the
air.266
The ACC has long described the violence that they have been subject to. A leader in the
ACC told one reporter that the ACC “wants to make sure the world can see how these mining
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companies are dividing our community and creating violence”.267 The peoples of
Umgungundlovu allege that TEM’s BEE partners “have engaged in organized campaigns of
violence”.268 The further explain that the “damage done to the AmaMpondo nation by the
politicians since this chaos started cannot be measured”.269 The ongoing effect of violence in
their community is to their cohesiveness and collective power as a peoples, thus repairing for the
conflict seems nearly impossible.
The use of language about a general area and a group of people ignores the fact that the
peoples are a collective defined by their relationship to a territory. In a moratorium imposed by
mining minister Mosebenzi Zwane in September 2016, Zwane cited “significant social
disintegration and highly volatile nature of the current situation in the area”.270 The phrase
‘social disintegration’ is a term used to focus the violence on the impacted peoples, framing them
as responsible for an internal issue. Referring to the ‘area’ is a general descriptor of a particular
place. The violence against a peoples, their culture, and their land, is unacknowledged.
The spatialization of conflict is reinforced by a narrative that ‘anti-mining activists’ are
influenced and organized by “outside influence”, including the influence of wealthy white
environmentalists and foreign NGOs. Such a claim is belittling to the collective solidarity and
strength of the Xolobeni peoples. For example, pro-mining leader from the Amadiba area,
Qunya, has accused the ACC of telling people that mining is bad for the community and
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“causing chaos so that they get more funding.. If there are no donors involved, how come they
can afford a lawyer like Richard Spoor?”.271 Gwade Mantashe states in an interview with
journalist Sam Sole, he discussed the overbearing influence of well-resourced NGOs based in
Johannesburg, many of which receive funding from international sources. He explains that he
wants to talk to the “rural based organization that may not be formally registered and all that
[because] they are in a village”272 to get their opinion about mining.
Prominent mining proponents appear to believe that conflict and environmental
destruction are inevitable in mining. Brother Mark and Patrick Coruso, the former being the chief
executive of MRC, are notorious for this perspective. The ACC alleges in a press statement in
2007 that in conversation with Patrick, he told them violence was inevitable. When ACC
members asked, “Don’t you understand that this project leads to bloodshed in our community?”,
Patrick relied “In my experience you cannot have development without blood”.273 When asked
about the need to balance sustainable development with mining as a development tool, Gwade
Mantashe replied: “I come across that all the time – I’m a mine-worker myself. You know how I
normally describe mining? I say it is difficult. It is dangerous. It is dirty. It is diseased. Okay,
that’s mining… Now, if you can take extreme positions on that matter we will not have what is
called sustainable development”.274
In a final example, in the Mbizana municipality’s Integrated Development Plan 20202021, the conflict is briefly commented on. The Plan refers to ‘internal fighting’ as a potential
barrier to the development of the tourism industry in the municipality and suggests that such
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disagreements are inevitable: “there are community structures such as the crisis management
[appears to refer to the ACC] that are interested only in mining versus the community trust that is
interested in tourism. These structures are fighting about two different sectors and there is no
solution as to which sector can be prioritized and how to strike a balance in both structures”.275

Divide and disrupt
Central to the work of the state has been a campaign to ‘divide and disrupt’, leading to conflicts
that can be narrated as ‘internal’ or ‘inter-communal’ conflicts arising from within the impacted
group. ‘Divide and disrupt’ refers to a practice on behalf of the state and mining interests that
seeks to divide the Umgungundlovu community by giving particular peoples resources or gifts
for their support, elevating the status of peoples by naming them leaders without community
consultation or support, planning meeting and populating them with supporters while sidelining
participants who are against mining, or by direct acts of violence that incite fear and intimidate.
Since the mining licence was granted in 2007, multiple ‘community’ meetings and
celebrations have been organized in Xolobeni by the state in support of the mine. These meetings
have often been disrupted or decried as illegitimate by the peoples of Umgungundlovu. For
example, in August 2008, the Minister of the DMR, Buyelewa Sonjica, organized a jamboree in
in Xolobeni to celebrate the award of the mining right to MRC. As described by journalist Same
Sole, “the authorities bused in people from far beyond the mining area and laid on free food,
entertainment and registration facilities for identity books and social welfare grants… marshals
kept a register, seemingly for mining lobbyists to record a huge groundswell of support”.276 Even
at this time it was alleged that only a “handful” of people were against mining, and these people
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were influenced and organized by John Clarke, perpetuating a long-standing narrative that
protest against the mine was influenced by white outsiders and foreign NGOs.277
Again, in 2017, while the Xolobeni dispute was in court, the Minister of DMR, Gwade
Mntashe, organized a meeting in Xolobeni on 23 September. There was a perception among the
ACC that people were brought into the event from areas not impacted by the mining. Attendees
who wanted to speak against mining were blocked from entering the tent where Mantashe was
speaking. The DMR, arguing in support of their meeting, reported that only “a small group of
people were instigated to disrupt and supress discussions, but the meeting proceeded as planned”
– alleged only the ACC was against mining, while 9 other groups were in support.278 The
meeting exploded into chaos when police fired tear gas into the crowd and people began running.
Richard Spoor, who represented the peoples of Umgungundlovu against mining, was arrested
and charged with inciting violence, charges which were later dropped.
These meetings are examples of the structural violence that the Umgungundlovu peoples
experience because they undermine the collective authority of the Umgungundlovu peoples and
their governance structures. Customary law is not a written set of rules, it is a set of governance
practices, ways of living collectively and in relationship to the land and territory. These staged
meetings are a direct threat to the authority of customary law. They do operate, however, with
the backing of state law to the extent that they are not illegal and they are even supported by, or
protected by, the police. The meetings are a direct attack against the jurisdictional authority of
the peoples of Umgungundlovu. It is via these challenges to their jurisdictional authority that we
can identify contemporary expressions of law’s violence.
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Resisting the (territorializing) technologies of jurisdiction
Contestations around jurisdiction are not only articulated in relation to governing authorities, as I
explained in relation to traditional leadership. Technologies of jurisdiction are also the site of
resistance, whereby the peoples of Xolobeni assert their rights to place and territory by resisting
encroaching technologies of jurisdiction. Technologies, in the Foucauldian sense, refer to means
and tools by which ideas or political strategies are enacted through everyday practice. As Dorsett
and McVeigh explain "[t]he technologies of jurisdiction gives us a kind of 'law craft', showing us
how not only to get on with making law work, but how to think about making law work
differently".279 Technologies of jurisdiction include writing, mapping, precedent and categories.
These technologies have a double force: to make legible and to authorize/legitimate through their
very legal legibility.280 Technologies of jurisdiction enable repetitive and consistent decisionmaking and provide important means of ordering law and establishing authority.
Technologies of jurisdiction are fundamental to understanding how it is spatialized in
particular places. The spatial character of jurisdiction is produced through technologies of
mapping that identify and demarcate territories and parcels of land. While jurisdiction depends
on mapping territory, it was not always the case that jurisdiction, particularly over people, was
expressed through technologies of mapping. In Medieval England, for example, jurisdiction was
determined by status, whereby ranks, groups, or classes of people were given particular legal
positions.281 However, it was through the introduction of the technology of mapping that
jurisdiction was shifted from being based on status to being based on territorial jurisdiction.282
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This example underscores the extent to which jurisdiction is co-constituted in specific ways
through the production of new technologies of making legible (a topic returned to below).
It is through the technology of mapping that jurisdiction takes a territorial form. In her
article ‘Mapping territories’, Shaunnagh Dorsett (2007) explains that “jurisdiction is inaugurated
through the mapping of physical space… As a technology of jurisdiction, mapping allows space
to be reconceptualized as place… and… allows the legal space of jurisdiction to be mapped on to
the physical space of the land and sea”.283 Moreover, “the unknown became knowable and, more
importantly, claimable. The place of territorial jurisdiction could be created out of the space of
the unknown”.284 Technologies of mapping were fundamental to European colonial expansion,
as early colonists produced maps of previously ‘unmarked’ areas and effectively created
opportunities for expansion and justified claims to jurisdiction over them. The emergence of
mapping, and the unique cartographic tools used to map territories, was fundamental to the
emergence of jurisdiction as a form of legal control over territories and subjects.
There are three technologies of jurisdiction that I have identified as sites of state-backed
jurisdictional claims and community resistance. First, the use of steel pegs to mark out the
highway. There have been multiple instances where peoples in the Amadiba territory have found
steel pegs inserted in the ground to mark out the highway that they did not authorize. In August
2019, for example, workers were stopped from putting steel pegs in the ground for SANRAL to
mark the N2WCR. As reported by the ACC, “Mr Mashona Wetu, induna in Headwoman’s
Council of Umgungundlovu, traditional area on the Amadiba coast (called ‘Xolobeni’), told the
workers from KwaZulu-Natal that they had been misled. This is the people’s land. It is not the
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Mayor’s land or the government’s land. Everything here starts at the community’s Komkhulu
(Great Place).”285 Multiple speakers during a meeting with the CEO of SANRAL explained that
steel pegs were allegedly put in cemeteries, on brought ‘during the night’ without the community
knowing.286 Community members have also forced contractors who were putting in steel pegs
out of their territory in an attempt to stop the highway development.287 Community statements
illustrate how steel pegs have themselves become a sign of an encroaching state; symbolic of
forced development as infrastructure is mapped over their territory.
Second, the use of attendance registers by state agents are often identified by community
members are members of the Amadiba Crisis Committee. The attendance registers are identified
as a way to gain perceived widespread consent for the highway. One community member
explains,
another thing that really bothers me is that there are attendance registers with
people who say that they want this road. You hold these meetings in those
areas far away and ask them if they want a road. Those people sign and they
say they want a road. But then that road is going to be constructed here. Why
don’t they say that they want that road to happen where they are? Please take
your attendance registers in your office and look up the persons who say they
want a road. Build your road there. Please, leave us in peace. Too much blood
has been spilled here in Amadiba.288
Both the stakes for the highway and the attendance registers are used by state actors as evidence
in support of a claim to authority over territory. A further, and more elaborate technology of
governance over territory, is the use of a survey.
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SANRAL has completed an extensive consultation to support the highway development.
SANRAL claims: “In 2015, a survey by the Human Sciences Research Council found 98.8%
support from over 3000 respondents in or from the Pondoland region. When speaking with all
kinds of different groups and communities, SANRAL has found that this is true. Even amongst
persons initially opposed to the project, when the facts were shared, there is now support or at
least acceptance”.289 A review of the survey, however, reveal that these results are unsurprising,
due largely to the design of the survey.
The survey was developed through initial focus group discussions that informed the
development of the questionnaire and design of the survey questionnaire. A total of 2314
respondents participated across 10 towns and villages. While the reach of the survey is
impressive, respondents where asked only general questions, such as ‘Would you like to see a
new national road built between Lusikisiki and Port Edward?’.290 ‘If the new national road were
to be built, do you think more people from other places would come and live here?’, ‘Do you
think that new job opportunities would be created in this area during construction of the new
road?’. They do ask about potential disadvantages to the road, asking specifically: ‘If this new
national road were to be built, what would the ONE greatest disadvantage be to you?’ (a)
Damage to the environment (b) Dangerous and fast-moving traffic (c) Corruption (d) Loss of
land or infrastructure (e) Better access for criminals’. No where do they ask if respondents would
be willing to be moved from their homes, if they imagined that the road might impact their
community or ancestral graves, some of the main issues in the case now. Yet, SANRAL
routinely refers to the general aspects of the survey – its reach and numbers of peoples engaged
with – as a way to legitimate it.
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SANRAL provides a summary of their funding in a final survey report. They explain,
“Almost all respondents in all localities say that if the new road were to be constructed, job
opportunities in other towns would become more accessible; more people from other places
would come and live in their village; and the children of their household would attend school in
another town or village”.291 The authors of the survey and report admit, however: “It should be
borne in mind that at no stage were respondents shown a map of any proposed route for the N2
and their answers to these questions would have been based on speculation and hope that the
proposed route would bring these benefits of improved access”.292 In other words, the survey
respondents were only presented with a vision for the highway and a range of general benefits of
having the infrastructure built near them. The specifics of the road construction, and its specific
impacts, remained completely out of the survey and therefore unknown to the survey
respondents. Yet the findings of this report are cited as authoritative in the court papers filed by
the respondents and in the judgement.

Legal geographers argue that law has a consequential role in producing space and
territory. Moreover, they argue that property is a territorial relation to the extent that it arranges
peoples and places in relations with one another. Law and society scholar David Szablowski
(2019) similarly uses the concept of territorialisation in his study of extractive industry
governance; his work provides important insights for a legal geography of international law.
Szablowski explains that large-scale extractive industry investment, particularly in areas of the
globe where states have little governance capacity in ‘far flung’ and rural areas, depends on
creating ‘territories of extraction’ in order to legitimate and enable extractive activities. He
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explains that this involves “the remaking of legal, social, political, and ecological spaces through
a spatialized reordering of authority in order to facilitate and prioritize resource extraction over
other activities".293 A central characteristic of these processes is the use of transnational
extractive industry governance norms. It is worth quoting him at length:
Typically, making extractive territories involves marginalizing the influence of
local institutions and actors over territorial governance... Thus, mining codes
or mineral agreements override or undermine local property rights; municipal
authority over land use planning is displaced by decisions of the national
energy or mining ministry; customary authority over irrigation is superseded
by licenses issued by the national water authority; etc. This involves displacing
both official and unofficial normative systems operating within local legal
spaces.294
His work demonstrates how extractive industries impose their control over territories not through
making claims to sovereignty, or asserting sovereign jurisdictions, but rather by legitimating
their intervention through a multi-scalar and multi-sectoral governance regime.
The survey, described above, is one technology used to inaugurate state jurisdiction. In
other words, the state performs its jurisdiction through the survey. In an opinion article,
Ayabonga Cawa reflects on the contemporary means by which rural peoples’ autonomy is being
attacked, arguing that “the state’s instruments of coercion can in one era be helicopters and tear
gas, and in another surveys, referendums and a deep mistrust of the people who should by rights
choose for themselves the livelihood strategy suitable to them”.295 There is a consequential
spatiality to this contemporary violence. The spatial scope of the survey serves as a means to
territorialize ‘local’ conflict and disagreement. Making a distinction between jurisdiction and
territory is important for illustrating these dynamics.
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Some researchers who use the concept of territory in their work have introduced the idea
of multi-territoriality. This is the concept of “territory from the perspective of multiple
overlapping power relations, from the most obvious material processes of political and economic
power to more subtle – yet no less significant – processes of symbolic power”.296 In this respect,
the concept of ‘territorial pluralism’ has been used to examine how self-government, equitable
forms of recognition, and power sharing arrangements are negotiated with the state297 while
anthropologists Dussart and Poirier use the idea of “entangled territorialities” to “engage with
the multiplicity and variability of connections, with the inevitability of correlations, the
uncertainty of their outcomes, and the unintended consequences".298 For me, however,
jurisdiction does the important conceptual and explanatory work of multi-territoriality by
focusing on the fact that many different jurisdictions can exist in one space, indeed this is the
norm between municipal, provincial, and federal governments, for example. Jurisdiction,
explain Shiri Pasternak, “marks the inauguration of a legal order, whereupon authorities of
various kinds govern the ways in which these laws will be ordered and organized in space, and
define its subjects and scope".299 She explains overlapping jurisdictions and their administrative
regions and boundaries as micro-powers, akin to a ‘thickening heap of lines’ on a map; “[t]hese
micropowers, enacted under federal and provincial jurisdictions, have carved out spatial patterns
of land use and population control that defy easy mapping".300 It is within conditions of
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overlapping jurisdictions that ‘inter-communal’ conflict emerges as a territorialized form of
violence, created through legal means and assumed to be responded to via legal means. Thus
law, in creating that which it presumes to represent, also assumes the authority to respond, a
central feature of law’s violence.
These are three ways that I have found that the ACC is resisting the technologies of
jurisdiction; there could be more. What these three examples demonstrate is how efforts by the
state to map the territory for mining and infrastructure development are actively resisted. These
acts of resistance, including pulling up stakes or sending away people trying to put them in, as
well as reporting critiques of the attendance registers, are assertions of authority and evidence of
a competing claim to jurisdiction. Therefore resistance to the technologies of jurisdiction offer an
opportunity for the peoples of Xolobeni to assert their claims to territory and collective
autonomy.

Ihlazo
Long-time ally of the people of Umgungundlovu, social worker John Clarke, regularly films
meetings and trials related to the struggle and uploads them to YouTube. A video titled Ihlazo
documents, without edits, a meeting between the peoples of Xolobeni at their Konkhulu with the
CEO of the South African National Roads Agency. The video is a rich archive of community
sentiment about the highway development. Statements in the video speak directly to the violence
experienced against the collective authority of the peoples of Umgungundlovu. It is with these
statements that I conclude this chapter.
Pondo customary law requires that you sit with us first and negotiate before
you proceed with any plans. So you have already failed because you have
violated our customary law. If you are carrying on, it should mean that you
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have permission… We do not want it, because you did not start where you
were supposed to start…As you can see, we are here.301
In the quote below, the efforts of SANRAL to divide and agitate are clearly articulated.
SARNAL, as you can see and as you can hear the damage that you have done,
it is irreparable. Firstly, you broke down our chieftainship of the Pondo people
from the top, right from the king all the way down to the chiefs. Now, that is
irreparable. Secondly, you are causing conflicts between relatives and you are
showing that you do not respect people. Thirdly, as government, you do not
respect us. I don’t know what government you are. If you were the government
of South Africa, you would have respected us.302
The war that you all have created: for how long do you want it to go on? For
how long do you want to see Pondoland blood spilled? You cannot fix this
anymore. You have caused too much damage. You have caused damage in our
chieftaincy. You’ve caused damage down to the people. There is a song in
Pondoland that says: You have caused conflicts amongst the relatives. That is
exactly what you have done. You have pitted us against each other, even
relatives. That is why we say you cannot fix this any longer… You must take
your steel pegs, your tractors, you and your contractors leave. If not, there will
be blood spilled... This is our land. If needs be we are prepared to let the grass
grow on our backs… we are fighting for this land so that we can live
peacefully. We don’t want anything that disturbs us.303
In these statements we can read the violence felt by the peoples of Umgungundlovu, as well as
the harm caused by the violence in their communities. Remember, there is an entrenched
ideology that positions Indigenous peoples as threats to the state and to democracy. Flowing
from this is a perspective of local peoples, asserting their collective rights and autonomy, as
agitators, groups plagued by inter-communal conflict. In this chapter I have outlined the
emerging jurisprudence on the Right to Say No, and demonstrated continued forms of legal
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violence expressed through jurisdictional claims to territory. One of the effects of these
jurisdictional claims is the territorialization of ‘inter-communal’ conflict.
Law’s relationship to violence is foundational, that it is performed (and iterated) through
language, discourse, and material inscriptions. Property and jurisdiction constitute particular sites
where law’s violence is spatialized. One of the sociolegal effects of these conditions is that legal
geographies of law’s violence contribute to the production of social and political knowledge
about conflict, particularly conflicts over resources.

Conclusion: Reflections on Self-Determination, Jurisdiction, Property and Legal
Violence in South Africa
In Canada self-determination almost always is a claim to autonomy. However, in South Africa,
self-determination is paradoxically a claim to citizenship rights. This is not a diminishing of the
significance of the claim to collective, rather it speaks to the conditions in which selfdetermination is being asserted. During apartheid in South Africa, self-determination was used to
exclude black and coloured South Africans from citizenship rights. The Bantustans were used to
segregate racialized South Africans in ‘self-governing’ territories within the borders of South
Africa. Today, however, we are witness to re-articulations of self-determination in South Africa,
but in productive relationship with claims to citizenship. This is indeed a paradoxical pairing that
is indicative of the present conjuncture. Self-determination and citizenship rights are woven
together through the nascent legal and political movement for the ‘right to say no’ to resource
extraction. The right to say no is fundamentally oriented towards exposing the violence endemic
to the mining industry. It also expands the human rights vocabulary to provide a nuanced view of
collective rights with an emphasis on the importance of land for spiritual practices and collective
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identity, values that are severely under threat by the mining industry. This is not a ‘reemergence’ of self-determination; it is an articulation in the present conjuncture.
Rather than assuming that self-determination is a claim against the state for an alternative
state-based form of autonomy and sovereignty, we might be inspired by the law and politics of
the right to say no to begin to understand self-determination as a response to continuing forms of
structural violence whereby peoples are attempting to have a stake and decision-making
authority in place-based development practices. The framework foregrounds the role of state and
corporate actors, as well as traditional leaders (who may also identify in the prior two groups), in
creating conditions of human insecurity and violence, leading customary communities to turn to
demanding the right to consent (via self-determination) as a legal remedy to ongoing deprivation.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
Introduction
In this conclusion I provide a summary of some of the specific interventions I have made
throughout the thesis, as well as a reflection on the broader questions that underpin the analysis.
In this thesis I compare, in a transnational and cross-contextual way, two struggles happening in
parallel in Canada and South Africa respectively – Wet’suwet’en and Xolobeni. I argue that the
ongoing struggles in Wet’suwet’en and Xolobeni are illustrative of how self-determination is
articulated in particular political, legal, and ecological environments. The thesis illustrates the
different contexts in two countries where the right to consent has emerged as a key battleground
for self-determination in settler-colonial and post-colonial contexts. The case studies illustrate
the multi-scalar legal landscapes in which the right to consent is negotiated, including customary
and indigenous legal traditions, constitutional law, jurisprudence, and international law, and how
the articulations of these different scales of law occur in the particular contexts of each country.
Through my analysis of competing jurisdictions, I identify contemporary legal violence in
conditions of legal pluralism.
At the broadest level my effort has been to examine slow violence, referring to the
ongoing and incremental forms of violence that are often left out of analysis of the spectacular
and explosive violent effects of resource extraction. This perspective influences how I approach
the concepts of jurisdiction and property. I destabilize centralized and state-based forms of
property and jurisdiction to understand them both as constituting specific sets of relations. I
explain in the thesis that legal violence is spatialized through contestations over property and
jurisdiction. I further explain, at different parts of the thesis, the methods of erasure and
processes of division and disruption are key to the facilitation of law’s violence.
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Examining the relationships between self-determination and legal violence has been a
way for me to study how law is implicated in, and productive of, new forms of violence while
not overlooking the agency of Indigenous and rural peoples. Rather, I contend, it is precisely by
studying legal violence that I may better understand the specific articulations of Indigenous selfdetermination in a transnational and comparative way. As the comparative study between
Unist’ot’en and Xolobeni show, Indigenous Peoples’ articulations of self-determination emerge
in complex social contexts, where transnational law, national commitments to transitional justice,
country-specific jurisprudence, the particularity of extractive or infrastructural development,
coalesce in relation to historical forms of colonization. Finally, by focusing on legal violence, as
I have here, I have narrowed in on the specific role of law as an interface of negotiation,
concentrating on the power of law as both a source of authority and legitimacy and a site of
resistance. This approach provides a way to investigate the very specific moments and
intersections where settler-colonialism is animated against the resistance of Indigenous and rural
peoples.
In both chapters I provide a history of the emergence of the right to consent, beginning
with the constitutional frameworks and moving through jurisprudence. In chapter two I explain
Aboriginal rights and title and the development of the duty to consult and accommodate. I
provide some international context for these legal developments by comparing them with the
international standard of free, prior, and informed consent. I identify how this legal architecture
reproduces a centralized, hierarchical property regime, and assumes neat divisions between
jurisdictions. Common positivist presumptions about property and jurisdiction do not account for
the complex and overlapping forms of authority and power that actually exist in negotiations
between the Environmental Assessment Office, Wet’suwet’en band councils and hereditary
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leadership, provincial and federal governments and their jurisdictions. The injunction against the
Wet’suwet’en resistance, for example, was one site where a centralized and hierarchical
conception of property is reproduced, and conflicts narrated. The logic and operations of
injunctions perpetually positions First Nations as agitators, pushing them to the knife edge of
criminalization. Injunctions also generate new politics of jurisdiction whereby resistance to
injunctions – including setting up blockades or establishing a camp – are means to claim
jurisdictional authority over territory.
In chapter three I focus on the ongoing struggle in Xolobeni. I describe Xolobeni as a
frontier ecology. I explained that the struggle in Xolobeni is not only focused on a mine, but also
on the development of a highway. A complex history of apartheid-era resistance to forced
removals, conservation initiatives, and state neglect of infrastructure development also
characterize this complex landscape. Efforts to divide and disrupt the local traditional
governance structure are particularly clear in the Xolobeni case study, as I explain. I demonstrate
how the struggle, while taken to the courts, is also being waged through specific jurisdictional
micro-politics, including resistance to stakes put in by the South African National Roads Agency
and attendance registers used at meetings. Throughout the chapter I draw from community
statements to describe the forms of violence they have been subject to, despite their important
legal victories.

Reflections on jurisdiction
It is useful here to recall some key insights from the literature on jurisdiction. Legal geographer
Sheri Pasternak explains that jurisdiction refers to a the inauguration of law, or the "authority to
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have authority", and is therefore a key site of contestation and conflict.304 It is precisely the
plurality of legal systems, mapped as a single sovereign space, argues Pasternak, that masks state
power.305 She explains this complex landscape:
The internal parcelization of territorial space, the state’s claims to absolute
space, and the on-the-ground jurisdictional practices that codify and mark
struggles over natural resources, all work to undermine representations of
jurisdiction that neatly lay settler and Indigenous jurisdiction side by side,
whether in scalar or other formations.306
Examining each case as a struggle over jurisdiction has been useful for understanding how, in the
context of legal pluralism, different laws overlap and map onto the landscape. It is also helpful
for thinking through claims to the landscape not as the production of governance regimes (or as a
territorial claim), but as assertions of authority expressed through practice. For example, in both
cases we are witness to material acts used as forms of resistance to claim jurisdiction over
territory, including building a camp in Unist’ot’en or weekly meetings at the konkhulu in
Xolobeni and the pulling out of stakes to disrupt the work of SANRAL. Jurisdictional overlaps
characterize the struggles in Xolobeni and Unist’ot’en; moreover, as I show, they spatialize and
normalize law’s contemporary violence.
Dorsett and McVeigh explain that while “terms like dignity, rights, autonomy, and selfdetermination are often used to engage the two forms of jurisdictional authority”, this kind of
dichotomous rendering “should be treated with care. It is the practices of jurisdiction that provide
the craft and form of life of lawful relations that are brought to the meeting place of laws".307 In
the case studies of negotiations over the right to consent provided here I demonstrate that the
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character of lawful relations can be usefully described as violent. Violence is not a result of
failed processes of consent, but is actually a formative force in the production of socio-legal
struggles for the right to consent. In other words, legal violence is not an outcome of failed
consultation processes, it is embedded throughout and therefore a productive site that contributes
to the production of specific social relations. Legal violence animates consultation processes.
This finding parallels Pasternak’s findings on jurisdiction. She argues that it is through
jurisdiction that “settler sovereignty organizes and manages power… in the absence of legal
agreement, a perpetual struggle over jurisdiction defines the terrain".308
This has implications for how I understand frontier ecologies. Resource frontiers are
widely understood to be characterized by changing forms of government, where previous forms
of political and institutional legitimacy and authority are being challenged and replaced by new
governance regimes that include new institutional arrangements, forms of expertise, and material
practices.309 Frontiers are spaces of intensified re-making, where just as new kinds of social
relations and governance arrangements are created, others are destroyed. Resource control on
frontiers is both a destructive and constructive process wherein prior rights and claims are
delegitimized and new ones gain currency and authority.310 This study demonstrates a further
characteristic of frontier ecologies – they are spaces where jurisdictional authorities are not yet
settled. The conception is based in a broader understanding of legal pluralism, and accounts
specifically for the layered claims to jurisdiction, including multiple state and non-state forms of
jurisdiction.
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Reflections on consent
In reflecting on this thesis I have come to understand the processes and rights that underpin
consultation not as representation of peaceful resolution, but as conjunctures that re-arrange
conditions of social conflict wherein colonial forms of power are re-produced. Historical power
inequalities, while significantly challenged through the activism of local communities and their
role in developing the right to consent, re-emerge through consultation processes in important
ways.
Processes of consultation and the right to consent have woven through them new forms of
legal violence that position land defenders on the knife edge of criminalization. In other words,
while community members may participate in consultation processes, as soon as they skirt
outside of these programs, as soon as they challenge the outcomes, they are immediately
criminalized and subjected to historical colonial narratives of under development, ‘intercommunal’ conflict, lawlessness – the ‘others’ of modernity and outside of modern law.
Structural power-relations are determinative to the extent that in the event of disagreement
between impacted communities and states bent on facilitating extraction, states and extractive
industry have an arsenal of historical forms of prejudice against racialized, rural, and Indigenous
peoples at their disposal to undermine the legitimacy and authority of land defenders. These
historical forms of prejudice are underpinned by positivist understandings of jurisdiction and
property, as I have show throughout the thesis.
This is not to suggest that emerging international rights to consent are doomed to fail. It
is rather to argue that the struggle for consent is part of a much wider struggle for decolonization
whereby the rights of historically marginalized peoples need to be elevated, recognized, and
legitimated across space and scale. Decolonization at these sites demands challenging not only
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the power of the ‘state’, but also the legal and ideological edifice behind centralized notions of
property and state-based forms of jurisdiction. It demands recognizing the forms of property
ownership and jurisdictional claims made by Indigenous peoples in their efforts to protect their
rights to territory. This involves unsettling presumptions about neatly demarcated jurisdictions
and identifying how they are contested. Moreover, it demands identifying how, through conflicts
over jurisdiction, authorities and legitimacies are reformed.
Finally, processes of consent are highly contested sites whereby state and corporate
actors, Indigenous peoples, as well as wider national publics engage through news and social
media. In these contexts, how conflicts are narrated, and who has the power to inform narrations
of conflict, is a significant issue. As I have shown, the ideological structure of both real property
in land, as well as assumptions about state-based jurisdictional authority, contribute to the
production of narratives about conflict whereby Indigenous peoples are positioned as being
complicit in, or causing, conflict.

Reflections on transnational dynamics and the criminalization of land defenders
How indigenous and rural autonomies engage with the international right of self-determination,
and its derivative right of FPIC, is distinct in each locale. In this thesis I have argued that the
distinctiveness of local engagements with FPIC has to do with both the histories of colonization
in each country, as well as the specifics of contemporary struggle. I have argued that both the
historical, colonial violence of law as well as the day-to-day practice of law produces forms of
legal violence. Self-determination is asserted, I argue, in part through resistance to legal
violence. The significance of the focus on the relationship between self-determination and legal
violence is its utility in doing transnational and comparative work. As I have shown, it is useful
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for illustrating the specific role of law, jurisdiction, and property in struggles for selfdetermination.
Keeping forms of legal violence in view underscores the need to keep the remedial aspect
of the right to consent in focus. This point is particularly important in the context of a global rise
of FPIC as a transnational norm that is leveraged by a range of actors, frameworks, and laws in
many different contexts. Often assertions of FPIC don’t emphasize the fact that it needs to be
informed by transitional justice principles. The justice to be remedied here is the historical
exclusion of Indigenous and customary law by state legal systems, and thus the historical
exclusion of Indigenous jurisdictional authority. FPIC is powerful because the norm re-inserts
local power by providing a language and framework for historically marginalized peoples to
enter into global governance regimes that otherwise have been developed by powerful actors.
The study developed in this thesis keeps in tension both the articulation of self-determination and
the persistence of legal violence, and by doing demonstrates the need to keep a transformative,
transitional justice agenda at the centre of struggles for the right to consent to elevate historically
marginalized laws, customs, and collective autonomies.
The comparison of the struggles in Xolobeni and Unist’ot’en underscore that the politics
of self-determination are not determined by law. This may be self-evident for researchers in the
discipline of law and society. But in this thesis, I have identified some of the main structural
features that contribute to the unique articulations of self-determination. Self-determination,
while an international human right, is asserted in relation to the specific histories of colonialism
and the contemporary constitutional context. A further point might be made here: the
contemporary articulations of self-determination are also formulated in conditions of
neoliberalism. Further research might explore how conditions of neoliberalism, widely
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understood as both the downloading of state governance practices to non-state actors and market
mechanisms, as well as the re-arrangement of new forms of government, contribute to the
creation of contested environments where claims to self-determination are made.

Conclusion: Legal violence and the criminalization of land defenders
Legal violence has implications for how we might understand criminalization on resource
frontiers. Criminalization, for example, is not only about the discursive production of legality
and illegality. It begins through processes that undermine the social power of impacted peoples.
Fundamentally, I find, understanding legal violence is key to understanding how land defenders
are placed on the knife edge of criminalization. What moves someone so quickly from being a
community member, a parent, someone concerned about the survival of their families and their
cultures and their peoples, to a criminal? To someone without the protections of citizenship in
South Africa, to someone, in Canada, who is the target of a state purportedly committed to
reconciliation?
A few landmark reports have been published in the last two years telling of the dramatic
increases in murders of human rights and land defenders around the world, however most
concentrated in a few South American countries.311 Many authors turn to ‘criminalization’ as a
concept to explain the targeting of these defenders.312 The conclusions of the reports often call on
states and businesses to protect land defenders from harm. There is no question that such
measures are urgently needed. However, the optic of criminalization of individuals might also
serve to understate the structural conditions in which collectivities are targeted for trying to
protect their land and livelihoods. In other words, these reports of ‘red’ and ‘fast’ violence,
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Global Witness, supra note 2.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 2.
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whereby people are attacked or murdered, need to be supplemented by analysis of slow violence,
of which racialized peoples, Indigenous peoples, women, and the poor are over-represented.
Analysis of these contemporary struggles from the view of socio-legal studies might explore, for
example, new forms of legal violence (and their relationship to colonial violence) in extractivist
frontiers that contribute to divisions, disruptions, and insecurities experienced by organized
collectivities as well as the criminalization of individual land defenders. As I have shown, legal
violence is spatialized and territorialized through jurisdiction and property, an analysis that could
contribute to understanding the landscapes in which Indigenous peoples struggle against the
violent encroachment of their land and assert claims to self-determination.
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